

O F T H E
Q U A L I F I C A T I O N S

Requisite in a

Minister of State :

At any Season, but especially at this.

P A R T I I I .

Negligentia dissoluta, dolus est. *Ut habetur in
Leg. Civil.*

Memoriam ipsam cum voce perdidissemus, si tam in
nostra potestate esset oblivisci, quam tacere. *Tacit.
in Vit. Agric.*

Sed gnarus temporum, inertia pro sapientia fuit.

Excellentibus ingeniis citius defuerit ars qua civem
regant, quam qua hostem superent. *Liv.*

Dedicated to the Right Honourable
Robert Harley, Esq;

L O N D O N ,

Printed ; and Sold by *John Morphew*, near
Stationers-Hall, 1711. . Price Six-Pence.

OF THE
QUALIFICATIONS

Required in a
Minister of State:

At any Session, but especially at this.

PART III.

Negligentia dignitas, dolus est. Ut habetur in
leg. Civil.

Memoriam ipsam cum voce perdidimus, si tam in
nostra potestate esset oblitio, quam scire. Tamen
in No. Agric.

Seci gratia temporum, sacris pro sapientia suis.

Excellentibus ingenis civis delectis ars qua civem
regunt, quam qua hostem imperant. Ato.

Dedicated to the Right Honourable
Robert Harley, Esq;

L O N D O N.

Printed; and Sold by John Morphew near
St. Dunstons-Hall, 1711. Price Six-Pence.

For the

Right Hon^{ble} Robert Harley, Esq;

One of Her Majesties most Honourable Privy
Council, and a Commissioner of the
Treasury, &c.

May it please Your Honour,

TO be informed, that the whole, which at
this Juncture, I do judge necessary to be
said on this Subject, being now finished; I do therefore
humbly lay this *Third* and last *Part* thereof before you,
with the same Deference and Submission, and with the
same Entire Resignation of it, not only to your Autho-
rity, but to your Judgment, that the two former were
offered unto you.

And forasmuch, as the whole incumbent on me in
the performance of what I had undertaken, was *μὴν δι-
ωνεῖν ἀληθείᾳ* to sacrifice alone to Truth; I have accord-
ingly endeavoured to comply with, and strictly to observe,
the great Rule prescribed to whosoever writeth histori-
cally, namely, *Ne quid falsi scribere audeat, & ne quid
verum non audeat*, that he shall neither dare to write what
is false, nor forbear the writing of whatsoever is true.

But whereas, it is neither Truth alone, nor even
chiefly, that your Honour is to have in View, but that
the Province, in which you are employed, doth princi-
pally require and exact of you, that you do govern your
self by the Measures of Wisdom, without a careful and
exact Attendance whereunto, as Mercy may degenerate
into foolish Pity; so Justice may be transported in Bru-
tal Fury. So that while without a neglecting of Truth,
your

your Honour doth in the *Post* wherein you are placed, regulate your Conduct by the Measures of *Prudence*. You may comfort your self in imitating the Example of the Emperour *Alexander Severus*, of whom *Dion* saith, that *πῶς ἐπιμελὴς τῶν πρακτέων, ἀμελὴς τῶν αὐτῶ λόγων*, he minded and pursued what became him to do, he despised the Common and Vulgar Reports which were published concerning him.

Whereunto I do only beg Liberty of your Honour to add, that as neither your own Personal Interest, nor that of your Freinds, are to be allowed to bear any share in those Measures of *Wisdom*, upon which you act, but that the Safety of the Government, and the Welfare of the Dominions, are wholly and alone to over-rule and prescribe to you in that matter; so it will in most cases be needful, that you do *ad omnia*, not *pauca respicere*, before you come to a Resolution in your self, what either may, or ought, to be done according to the Rules of *Prudence*. And not to mention all that might be said on this occasion, (which would be to lengthen this Epistle beyond the Bulk of the ensuing Treatise) I shall only presume to call that of *Tacitus*, *Annal lib. 13.* To your Remembrance, viz. *Puniendos rerum atrocium Ministros, ubi premium adepti, scelera ipsa aliis delegent.* And suffer me to assure you, that by laying this before you, I do therein give you the greatest Proof I am capable of rendring, both how much, and with what Sincerity, I am,

May it please Your Honour,

Your Honours,

Most Humble, most Dutiful,

And most Obedient Servant,

Feb. 10. 1710.

R. F.

*Of the Qualifications Requisite in a
Minister of State, at any Season,
but especially at this.*

P A R T III

BUT to proceed without prefacing, to bring into View, and to discourse of the farther and remaining *Qualifications* requisite in a *Minister of State*, I shall begin this *Part*, with the laying open and declaring that a Person of the aforesaid Character, ought to be *one* wholly disentangled from, and altogether raised and elevated above *Covetousness* and *Ambition*; and *one* upon whom neither *Wealth* nor *Honour* can make the least Impression, to the Prejudice of his Sovereign, or to the Detriment of his Subjects. And the *First* thing I shall here observe is, that the Generosity and Bounty of no Prince whatsoever, can fully answer and come up to the Cravings and Expectations of an *Avarous* and *Ambitious* Man, forasmuch as it will be always found true, what *Seneca* *Epist.* 9. says of the first, viz. That *Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro*, an *avaritious* Man is not contented, and much less satisfied, with all the *Emoluments* and *Profits*, which are bestowed upon and do accrue to him; So what *Tacitus* observeth

B in

in relation to the latter, will at all times be no less certain; namely, that *Cupido dominandi, cunctibus affectibus flagrantior, a proud Man's Ambition, is more prevalent over him, than all his other Vices, let them be never so many; Annal. lib. 15.* So that such a one, will be always unsatisfied and demanding, tho' his Sovereign should both give him a Share in the Prerogatives of his Crown, and divide with him the Treasure of his Exchequer: Nor will he who cannot be satisfied with a Sufficiency acquiesce in, and much less be grateful for, abundance. For the more he drinks of his Master's Bounty and Generosity, he will only thirst the more; and if the Gratuities of this Year, do not exceed those of the former, he will account himself neglected and thereupon murmur, if he do not worse. For he will not be pleased in the being raised to a Superiority to others, as well in Opulency, as in Honours, if there be but any in the Dominions, who do but approach to him; and will much more shew himself highly offended, if they do but seem in Trust, Dignity, and Wealth, to equal him. For there are but very few, who study to deserve the Character, which *Tacitus Annal. lib. 14.* gives of *Cn. Lentulus*, viz. *Gloria fuerat bene tolerata paupertas, dein magna opes innocenter parata, & modesta habita*, i. e. to bear Poverty patiently, to gain Riches honestly, and to use them modestly, is the Glory of a good and great Man.

And this leadeth me to my *Second Observation*, with relation to this *Article*, Namely, that whensoever any one hath by Lucrative Places, and especially by great Military commands over the Forces belonging to the Crown, grown beyond the Interest, Power and Wealth of a Subject, how that such a Person, in what Trust and Favour soever he be, should have the most particular and critical Inspection and Watch kept over him in all the Parts of his Conduct and Behaviour. That there-
upon,

upon, tho' he may not have the least inclination to do ill (as I do not only hope but believe he hath not) yet that he may not be in a capacity to do it, if he should. That of the great Political Historian being true, *Tutus est perire non posse, quam juxta*; which I do forbear to English, seeing even *Joab*, who was both nearly related to King *David*, and had been likewise so greatly esteemed, confided in, and honoured by him, yet even after he had not turned aside after *Absolom*, did nevertheless fall in and joyn *Adonijah*, for the strengthening and supporting of him in his pretensions to the Throne: 1 Kings 2. from v. 28 to v. 35. Nor is any one in Power, who reckoneth himself unkindly treated and disoblighed, to be continued in a condition, wherein he may be able to pursue and compass his Revenge. Forasmuch as *Tacitus Historiar. lib. 1.* layeth it down for a Maxim and a standing Rule, *Tanto proclivius est injure i quam beneficio vicem exsolvere, quia gratia avari, ultio in quæstu habetur*: It is a greater satisfaction to some Men to revenge (even a meerly supposed) Injury than dutifully to acknowledge and recompence a kindness; in that Favours received are burthensome, but that Revenues are Sweet. Not that I do think the great Man (who is tacitly here insinuated) capable of so much as of entertaining a Thought, upon supposed Neglects, yea even on unkind Returns made to him for his wonderful Services, either of designing, or of doing, what may be injurious to Her Majesty and Her Government. But that a certain Number of his pretended *Votaries* and *Partisans*, thro' there publickly aspersing and defaming both the Queen and all the greatest for Number and Quality, as well as for Fealty of her People, as if in the room of gratefully acknowledging, and answerably recompencing, the noble and even unparalleled Services of the said great Man, they had not only unthankfully, but infamously treated and repaid him for them.

By which disloyal Means, the aforesaid seditious and turbulent Set and Herd of Men, do both endeavour to provoke the before intimated great Person, to seek and to pursue a Revenge, and do also by those Defamatory Speeches, study to give a Tacit Assurance of there being ready to assist him in whatsoever he shall attempt the Perpetration of against the Queen and Her Dominions. But I do hope, that the said great, and who hath hitherto approved himself a very discreet Person, will in relation to those Sycophants whom I have been mentioning, remember that of Tacitus Historiar. lib. 4. *Invidia in occultis, adulatio in operis, erant; i. e. there are some people, who do often inwardly most hate those, whom they do publickly most flatter.* And it will not be amiss for every Wise Man to take notice of the Method practised upon Manlius Valens (that hath ruined many honest unwary Men) as Tacitus mentioneth it, *Historiar. lib. 1. Quo incautior deciperetur, palam laudatus, he was the more openly praised, that he might be the more effectually ensnared.* And seeing I am too mean and insignificant, for the offering Advice in this matter to the aforesaid great Man, yet I hope he will not despise the the Counsel of Tacitus, *Annal. lib. 4. as to the bearing with Detractions and even Reproaches in some Cases, Namque spreta exolescunt, si irascere, agnita videntur: Reproaches when neglected and contemned, are the less credited, and do the sooner vanish; whereas the taking notice of, and the becoming enraged at them, are as well an acknowledgment of their being true, as a means of making them both the more firmly believed, and the longer kept up and more generally spread and diffused.*

But I do proceed to the Third Observation, which I am to offer in relation to this Article, namely, That a Sovereign is not to suffer a Minister to grow Rich, by any other Ways or Means, save by his own Generosity and Bounty, unless he do it from his own Inheritance, and

by

by his personal Frugality and good Oeconomy. This was what *Phillip II.* of *Spain*, who was accounted a wise and a politick Prince, required of, and prescribed unto his Principal, yea, even Favourite Minister: Telling him, that while he made it his alone Business, by his Application and Fidelity, to serve him in the *Post* wherein he had placed him, that it should be his Care to honour and enrich him. And for a Prince to permit even a Favourite Minister, to grow opulent otherwise than by his own Generosity, is to make the Spoils and Plunder of his People the Recompence for the doing of his Service. Yea, it is in Effect, by his Constituting of him to be his Minister, to give him Authority to Rob; which is directly repugnant to the End for which he doth, or at least should, chuse him. And tho' a Prince should avoid the being too narrow and scanty, in renumerating the Services of an industrious and faithful Minister, yet, as the said Prince should always do it with that Moderation, as not to straiten himself in his Exchequer; so he ought, also, to do it gradually, not antedating his Merits, but making what he bestoweth on him, to be the Reward and Recompence of them. And as sometimes Promises, with respect to the future, may be more convenient for a Prince to make a Minister, than to confer upon him large and ample Donatives in Hand: In that, by the former, he both secureth his Dependence, and quickeneth his Application to Affairs; whereas it may fall out, that by the Latter, he doth not only render him the more sloathful and supine, but doth put him into a Capacity of doing Hurt, in Case he were become discontented. And it were well, if some Sovereigns had the Knack and Art of our Queen *Elizabeth*, who used to recompence her first Ministers more, with a favourable Glance from her Eye, or a kind Expression from her Lips, to the encouraging of 'em in their Diligence and Fidelity, than other Sovereigns have been

suc.

successful in compassing, by their bestowing of lofty Titles, and ample Fortunes. However it will become the Wisdom of a Prince, not to be immoderate, and much less excessive, in the Promises he maketh to a Minister; forasmuch that he thereby doth not only lay his Royal Word to Stake, which he is in Honour, as well as in Justice (not to speak of his Varacity) bound sooner, or later, to redeem, and not to suffer it to be forfeited; but also by his doing so, he doth expose himself to the Reflection and Censure, which *Tacitus Historiar. lib. 3.* fasteneth upon *Vitellius*, that he was *largus promissis*, & *qua natura trepidantium est immodicus*; Large in his Gifts, and excessive in his Promises, which were the Effects of his Fear, not of his Bounty: Nor will such a Prince escape the experiencing what the same Author, *ubi supra*, saith of the same *Vitellius*, *Amicitias dum multitudine munerum, non constantia morum, continere putat, meruit magis quam habuit*; that while he sought to buy, and to purchase Friends, but did not wisely chuse them; he found after all, he had lavishly conferred upon them, for the rendering them true and faithful to him, that he had none, when he stood most in need of them.

Nor can I dispense with my self, in omitting to bring a few things into view, in relation to the Observation I have mentioned, before I do conclude what I have to say about it; whereof one is, That a King or Queen, are not to allow any Minister of State, especially, if he be one thought inordinately to love Money, to interpose in Acts of Mercy and Grace, between him, or her, and their People: For thereby such a Minister should not only be permitted to intercept the Acknowledgments and Praises, which are to be given to none, save to the Sovereign alone; but if he be discontented, and thereupon ill inclined, it doth put him into a Condition, either of lessening his Prince, in the Esteem
of

of those to whom the Mercy and Grace had been extended, or of making them Partisans for himself, instead of encouraging them to be the more loyal and dutiful Subjects to their Sovereign. And a wise Prince hath Reason to apprehend, that what Minister soever about him acteth so, doth it upon the Notice and Prospect which Tacitus expresseth *Historiar. lib 1. Quia dissidentia presentium, mutationem pavent, adversus publicum odium, privatam gratiam preparat, i. e. thro' his fancying that there may come to be a Change in his State and Condition, he doth therefore, beforehand, endeavour to make Devoids and Votaries for himself, at the Cost and Expence of his Sovereign's Goodness and Grace.*

Another thing which I am to lay open, with reference to the foregoing Observation, is That no Minister of State, especially if he be in Supream Command over his Sovereign's Troops and Forces, ought either immediately by himself, or by the means of his Relations, and his and their Agents and Undertakers, to have the Sale of Commissions of all sorts, which his Sovereign hath of her Kindness and Goodness, been pleased to Grant unto such, as she had been well informed of, and thereupon accounted them to be worthy and proper Persons to be employed in the respective Places and Stations, in which her Majesty had Authorised them to Command, Nor could a more dishonourable thing have been offered to the Crown, than that a little mercenary sort of People, going by the Stile and Denomination of Agents, should have been as much employed and encouraged, both in their Inquisitions, after what Commands in her Majesty's Armies were vacant; and also in the managing and concluding at what Prices previously advanced they were to be obtained, as ever either the *Brokers* on the *Exchange*, or the *Stock-Jobbers* in the *Alley* in *Cornhil*, o-

ver against it, were ever made use of in their several ways, not to say answerably to the Knaveries of some of them. By which Ways and Means of disposing and bestowing Commands in Her Majesties Armies, not only diverse of the First Quality in the Kingdom, were precluded from the obtaining their Relations and Freinds to be preferred and employed on their Recommendati-
ons, and also many brave Gentlemen of Narrow Fortunes, rendered incapable of coming to the Prices, which Commands at a calculated and estimated Value were sold for, but even they who had bought and purchased them at the set and stipulated Rates, were put upon the temptations, both of wronging their Subaltern's, as well as their private Sentinels, and also of oppressing those wheresoever their Marches lay, in order to the reimbursing themselves of so much at least, of what they had bought and purchased their Commissions at, as that they might thereby be in some Condition of living answerably to the several and respective Characters, which with the whole whereof they had been previously possessed, they were forced to buy and to purchase the procuring of them.

The next, *viz.* the *Third* thing, which I am to take notice of with reference to the foregoing Observation, being a matter of that high prejudice, both to the Sovereign and to the Subjects, as well as prodigiously Reproachful and Treacherous in it self, I should have been ashamed to name it, but that being of an Impression of no older Date, than the *late Ministry*, it is absolutely necessary to have the first Practice and Perpetration thereof so exposed and branded, that none who come to have that Authority about and under their Sovereign hereafter, which they who were criminal therein had, may dare to draw it into precedent and to transcribe after it. The matter in brief is this, that whereas heretofore it hath been always esteemed the Wisdom of our Sovereign's

raign's (and hath by Her present Majesty been so accounted, and acted up thereunto accordingly in a special manner) that such who are Employ'd to Serve the Crown, as Commissioners of the Custom's, Excise, &c. or in any of the chief Offices and Trusts relating thereunto, should have those competent and liberal Salaries allowed them in proportion to their respective and various Stations, as might not only encourage persons of very good Rank and Degree, as well as of Parts and Interest, to accept them; but might wthal as well render them sedulous and diligent in the discharge and execution of their Places, as set them out of the reach of Temptations of being fraudulent with respect to the Crown, or oppressive in relation to those Subjects, among and over whom their Authority and Power lay. Now as this Method hath been greatly departed from by these in the late Ministry, who had the appointing and constituting of such Commissioners and Officers entrusted with and deputed unto them, through their abridging and confining those they preferred to the aforesaid Employ's, to be contented with the *Moieties* (and sometimes with less) of the Legal Salaries, while in the mean time they applied the rest to the enriching of themselves, or to Uses subservient to private and personal Designs. Whereby and thro' their doing whereof, such dismal and mischievous Effects have ensued to the Crown, as well as to many of the Subjects, that I dare not take upon me to enumerate them; nor am I able to do it, without running into that Acrimony of Style, which the Right Honourable Person, to whom these Papers are humbly dedicated, will not allow of.

The *fourth* and last thing, which I have to bring into View, with respect to the aforesaid Observation is, that it giveth too much just Suspicion, of a certain great Persons, being either too *avarous*, or too *careless* of the Interest of his Sovereign, in that he must either have

[8]

ingrossed and applied to his own use, or must have permitted others to take hold of, and to appropriate to theirs, very great Sums of Money which were accruing to Her Majesty, and should have come into Her Exchequer, towards the helping and enabling Her to bear and defray the Charges of this tedious, expensive, and impoverishing War. For whereas by the Conquests made in *Flanders* and *Brabant*, (in the obtaining whereof, Her Majesty's natural Troops, and those of Foreign Princes hired and paid by Her, did bear a great Share, and were much concerned in the Honour and Glory of them) Large Contributions have been exacted and raised out of the Territories and Districts of the common Enemy, yet we have heard of no Proportion thereof, and much less of what should have arisen to Her Majesty by and from them, to have been either applied to the Payment of the British Troops, who are employed there, or remitted hither to be paid into the Treasury. Yet while such Princes, whose Troops we do first buy, and then do constantly pay, have been allowed the Shares and Proportions, (which they claimed of those Contributions, it hath been Her Majesty's Fate alone, to have had nothing arising and accruing to Her thereby. As if it were the part of the Queen of Great Britain, to have all Her Allies served and accommodated, without the having any Regard paid to Herself and her Dominions. So that by this and other Means, while the present War, with an exorbitant, nor to say with an almost ruinous Weight and Pressure, hath lain upon these Kingdoms, it hath been rendred easy, if not beneficial to some who have been therein our Confederates. Forasmuch as besides the large and strong Barrier which the Dutch have acquired upon and against all the French Provinces which lie near unto them, and by means whereof, they will be able either to defend themselves against any Impressions which may be made upon them

by

by that Monarch; or else to come to such a Peace with him, as may be for their Opulency as well as Safety. Yet neither our great General, who was so successful and prosperous in all those Operations, nor our State Ministry, who made it their Business, at the vast Expences of these Nations, to assist and support him therein, have shewed that Concern for these Dominions, as the Usurper, *Oliver Cromwell*, did; who, upon his Conjunction with the *French*, and the Victories which were thereupon obtained, took care to have *Dunkirk* resigned and delivered to us; while we have entirely given up, and abandoned *Ostend* to the Power and Possession of the *Dutch*, tho' it be the only *Maritime* Place that hath been taken from the Enemy. So that were I to calculate the Whole which our Crown hath acquired by this War, save what it might have obtained, as well as secured, by our own sole *Marine* Strength, provided we had applied but a small part thereunto, of what we have disbursed on Foreign Land Services, I cannot otherways express it, unless by rehearsing the Words in which the great Empetour, *Augustus Caesar*, is reported to have cried out, Weeping, *Quintili Vane redde Legiones*; which I do forbear to translate into *English*.

So that having dispatched whatsoever I could think pertinent, or at least at this Season convenient to be said, with reference to my *Third* Observation upon the foregoing *Article*; I do now proceed to the making of a *Fourth* Observation in reference unto, and upon the same *Article*, which is briefly this: That whosoever have acquired great and vast Sums of Money, either by the Generosity of their Sovereign, or by the Bounty of an *English* Parliament, ought to have the greatest part of it, either laid out upon the *Terra firma*, in these Dominions, or entrusted in the *Exchequer*, on the same Funds and Securities, and on the same Interests, which other Subjects; and may be many of

them of superiour Qualities to themselves, do place their Monies there. Seeing without their doing thus, the Government hath a slender Security for their Loyalty, in that there will be nothing to seize upon, in case they should prove treacherous, or rebellious, save what they can convey away with themselves, whom they will be sure to take all the imaginable Care of, which they possibly can.

But it is now more than time, to apply my self to the Discovery of a Fifth Qualification, requisite in One, who is called to be a Minister of State, namely, That he be a Person, not only of inviolable, but of approved Fidelity. And that he may prove to be so, some things are incumbent upon a Prince himself, with respect to his chusing of them: As First, That he do not only previously inquire, what his Intellectual Parts may be; but how he hath been Educated and Bred, and what his Morals are: For as, *ex quolibet ligno, non fit Mercurius*; a Mercury is not to be formed of every sort of Wood; --- *neq; omnis fert omnia Tellus*; all Land will not bring forth the same Grain; so there are some Educations, and Dispositions, become habitual thereupon, which do lie in a direct Repugnancy to the Qualities required in a Minister of State. For Youth spent in a course of Life, bordering upon Irreligion or Atheism, and an Education habituating him to publick Vices and Immoralities, are so many Prejudices against the Election and Advancement of such Persons, to be Ministers of State about their Sovereign. Seeing what is bred in the Bone, is not to be gotten out of the Flesh; and that, *naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurrit*, habitual Customs will be prevalent over the best Instructions and Examples, which may afterwards be given unto, and set before them. Yet, for a Sovereign to employ, and to trust such Men in his Council, may prove a Temptation to his People, of entertaining

entertaining an ill Opinion of himself: As if what *Tacitus Annal. lib. i.* saith of *Tiberius*, whereof mention hath been already made, (were to be apprehended, and feared, concerning him) *ex optimis periculum sibi*; that he did not think it safe for himself, to employ worthy Men about, and under him.

A Second thing, wherein a Prince should endeavour to be informed concerning a Person, whom he is about to raise, and to advance, to be a *Minister of State*, is, how he hath behaved himself in a private, or in an inferior Station. For tho' many may have carried it tolerably well, in a subordinate Office, or Post, who have come to act very ill, when called to be States-Men, according to the Proverb, *Magistratus probat virum*, that *Magistracy* doth discover what the Man is; yet as it has been seldom known, that ever one proved faithful, in a great deal, who had been faithless in a little: So it hath scarcely been ever observed, that they who had behaved themselves treacherously, or scandalously, in inferior Employments, acted with Fidelity and Honour, when they came to be exalted to supreamer Posts. And tho' a Sovereign will have always many Places to bestow, without his knowing upon whom to confer them, but as he is informed by others; yet he doth seldom (if ever) need any but himself to instruct him, whom he is to make his Ministers of State. And it would discover great Wisdom in Sovereigns, if they would neither suffer their own Affections to overrule their Judgments therein, nor permit others to prescribe to them in that matter. For whatsoever Prince distrusts his own Judgment in the Choice of his Ministers of State, will, besides his rendring himself thereby obnoxious to many other Inconveniencies, which I shall not here recount, tempt also those very Ministers, whom he hath so chosen, to act towards him as a Prince who

who hath no Judgment of his own, and who is therefore in all things to depend entirely upon theirs.

A *Third Thing*, wherein a Prince should not fail in the satisfying himself concerning a Person whom he chuseth to be a *Minister of State*, is, that he be *one* who hath both a most sincere Love, and also a high Esteem for his Person. Seeing whosoever he be who is chosen into such a *Post*, and doth not inwardly venerate, as well as cordially love his Sovereign, will be ready to do him the worst Offices he can, and also to betray him whensoever it conveniently falleth within his Circle to do so. And as no one, who either upon the account of intellectual, or of moral Imperfections, which he imagineth to be in his Prince, or who on a supposed Neglect received by, or an Affront put upon him by his Sovereign, can preserve that hearty Affection, and elevated Esteem for him, which he ought: So none such are to be employed in any Capacity about him, and much less to be honoured, and trusted, with the having the Character of being a Minister of State. And as it argued great Weakness in the last Duke of Burgundy, to trust *Campobach*, after that he had before not only affronted, but outrageously injured him. So the said Duke experienced the woful Effects thereof, in his being betray'd by *Campobach* before *Nancy*, where he lost his Life. Nor had *Cosmo de Medici*, who was a wise Prince, on his trusting *Pandolphus Pucci*, after he had before imprisoned him, escaped the being Murthered, if the said *Cosmo* had not been seasonably informed of the Conspiracy which *Pucci* had entred into, with others, for the assassinating of him. And therefore it was, that the prudent and wary *Romans*, after they had drove away *Tarquin*, and banished King'ship with him, would not afterwards employ any Person in the Affairs of the Republick,

lick
Far
ven
tha
ces
hav
tho
beh
Wi
ly
tion
wh
Op
the
the
as v
don
T
men
to b
refe
as l
finc
tion
be r
but
a Br
of S
be c
high
Mac
his
Hav
rity
Fall
with

lick, who either bore his Name, or was related to his Family; how well soever inclined they reckoned several of them to be to the Common-wealth. Not but that I do know, how there have been diverse Instances, ancient as well as modern, to the contrary, which have been attended with no fatal Consequences: But tho' that was to the Credit of those who being trusted behaved themselves well; yet it did not commend the Wisdom of those who employed them; and doth only shew, that their Luck was better than their Discretion. For no Hatred can be more dangerous than that which is kept concealed, until there be a favourable Opportunity for executing it. For what Tacitus, in the Life of Agricola, saith of Domitian, in relation to the said Agricola, will be found true concerning others as well as him, viz. *Optimum statuit reponere odium, donec impetus fame, &c. languesceret.*

The Fourth and last thing, which I shall at this time mention, wherein it is the great Concern of a Prince, to be both well informed, and to be fully satisfied, in reference to those whom he is to chuse, and trust, as his Minister of State is, that they be such who do sincerely approve, and do highly esteem, the Constitution and Form of the Government; that is, that they be neither of highly Despotical, nor of Republican, but of truly *English* Monarchical Principles. And for a *British* Sovereign to constitute one to be a Minister of State, who is either known, or justly suspected to be disaffected to Monarchy, is not only an Act of the highest Indiscretion, but of down right Distraction and Madness. And as *Antoninus* found the Consequence of his trusting *Avidius Cassius* (who bore an hereditary Hatred to Royal Government; he being of the Posterity of that *Cassius*, who was in the Conspiracy against *Julius Caesar*, and assisted in the Murthing of him) with a Government and an Army, in the said *Avidius*

Cassius's rebelling against him, so it may be the Fate of other Princes, to experience the like of what the fore-mentioned *Antoninus* did, if they shall be so imprudent as to imitate his Example. And tho' I do here most chearfully acknowledge, that there are many in these Dominions, who having in their Youth been misled into Republican Principles, are now become such Sincere and entire Converts to a love and esteem of the *British* Monarchy; as not only some of them to dare to starve for it, and others to be ready to shed the last Drop of their Blood in the supporting and maintaining of it; but to be universally of the Mind of those, whom *Tacitus Historiar. lib. 4.* mentioneth; *Bonos Imperatores vobis expetere, qualescunque tolerare,* to pray for good Kings, and nevertheless with Fealty and Patience to submit to bad: Yet that there are still too many of all sorts and ranks of Men, in these Dominions, so wretchedly possessed with Republican Principles, that no one who carrieth the Name of a King, or Queen, can obtain a quiet and legal Submission and Obedience from them. And the ill Returns which Her Majesty doth daily meet with, and receive from them, and that as well after all the Lenity and Mercy which She hath extended towards them in particular, as after all the Acts of Wisdom and Goodness which She hath exercised to the Subjects in general, do upon Her looking back to what She was above Twenty Years ago, force Her, by reason of their defamations and mutinousness, to say, as *Tacitus Historiar. lib. 1.* expresseth it; that She was *alieno imperio felicior, quam suo*; More happy, while in the Quality and Condition of a Subject, than She findeth Herself upon Her coming to be a Sovereign. But this being a Particular in reference whereunto diverse things would offer themselves to be said, which I have no Inclination, at this time, to mention; I shall therefore imitate that Painter, who being

to
a
d
w
fo
gl
ha
co
sa
fin
de
far
a
ov
ge
of
wh
Sta
wa
and
Pol
Im
Sov
pos
do
wha
wh
thin
whi
the
save
then
and
priv
Rule
very

to draw the Picture of a Face, which on one side had a great Scar upon it, chose rather to draw that side under a *Shade*, than to lay it open in Colours, which would have discovered and exposed the blemished Deformity of it. And if it were practicable, I should be glad to have that said of those, concerning whom I have been speaking, which *Tacitus* in his *Life of Agricola* saith, in relation to the *Pretorian Band*, upon the said *Agricola's* being chosen over them; *Ita Successor simul & Ultor electus, rarissima Moderatione maluit videre invenisse bonos, quam fecisse*; which I do forbear farther to translate, than that it may be the acting of a wise part, at some times, rather to conceal, and to overlook Faults, than to detect them, in order to the getting them punished.

But to proceed to the bringing into View some few of those many Occasions and Particulars, by reason whereof, and in relation whereunto, a Minister of State will have need for the Exercise of his *Fidelity* towards his Prince; and wherein, if he be not strictly and exactly careful, he will both act unsuitably to his Post and Character, and will deservedly fall under the Imputation of having been false and treacherous to his Sovereign, who had placed him in that Post, and reposed a Confidence in him. And the *First* is, That he do neither discover his Princes Personal Secrets, nor what is transacting, or transacted at the Council Board, where he sitteth as a Member; nor so much as any thing under his Cognisance and Knowledge whatsoever, which may relate to any part of the Administration of the Government, at Home or Abroad, for the future, save as he may be authorized and commanded to impart them; and then only to do it, when, where, how, and and to whom he is ordered. For if in reference to a private Person we be so confined and bound up, by the Rules of common Prudence and Justice, as that (as the very Poet saith,)

*Arca huius neque in Scrutaberis ullius unquam;
Commissumque regis, & vixit totius U. ira.*

we are neither to pry into Mens Secrets, nor either thro' an Unretentiveness, or a Talkativeness, by reason of Wine, nor yet upon a Provocation given us, to publish those Secrets, with the keeping whereof, we have been entrusted by any Man; much less are they who are Ministers of State upon any Motives whatsoever, to disclose Secrets which relate to their Sovereign and the Government, in that the Knowledge thereof is not only entrusted with them, to be concealed upon their Honour, as they are Gentlemen, but as they are Ministers of State, whose Oaths (as well as their Fidelities) obliging them thereunto, they cannot discover them, without the shewing themselves not only false and treacherous, but forsworn and perjured. It hath been heretofore thought, that a *Monarchy* had, in this matter, a great Advantage over *Republics* (as *Philip of Macedon*, in particular, is observed to have had over the *Athenians*) in that what was on the Tapit in the *My*, being trusted in fewer Hands than in the latter, must thereupon be kept more reserved and secret, until it came to be executed; we have, in our time, found the reverse and the contrary thereof to be true; which doth not much surprise me, in reference to the *Aristocracy* of *Venice*, in that the Fear and Dread of the Council of Ten, is a greater Confinement on all the numerous Senators of that Government, to keep them from talking and blabbing what they should not, than all Oaths whatsoever imposed upon Ministers of State, and on Privy Counsellors under a Sovereignty. Nor doth it elude give me much Astonishment that the *Dutch Republick* knoweth more of our Secrets, before they are imparted to them, by proper Officers deputed from

from hence, than we do know of theirs, until they be communicated to us by Ministers authorised to do it. Forasmuch that they not only have diverse of their Country-men here, who being dignified with Titles, and enriched with Estates, can find how to penetrate into what is transacting at our Council-Board, and then communicate it to their Country-men abroad; among whom, thro' a Fear of future Emergencies, they have lodg'd the Bulk of those Fortunes which they have acquired here; but that the said Republick (which I do mention to their political Commendation, I do not say their moral) doth, by peculiar Arts and Methods, come to know the weak side, as well as the strong, of every Minister, who serveth any Potentate in *Europe*, so as to apply agreeably to him, for the pumping, or for the scruing a Secret out of him.

Whereunto the whole that I will further subjoyn, in relation to this Particular, is briefly to observe, that there are *Three Means* or Ways, in and by which, either Persons or Secrets come to be discovered and betray'd. The first of which is, That of direct *Treachery*, either upon a Reward, or a Bribe received, or at the least hoped for and expected. And in this way few Persons or Affairs have had the Fate to be ever betrayed: In that none are capable of doing it on those Motives, save such as are of most profligate Principles. Yet as some have always been, so likewise there will ever be such while there are weak and credulous People in the World to trust others, or ill Men in it, who know how to insinuate themselves upon others, so as to be trusted by them. For as *Tacitus Annal. lib. 15*, saith, *Cruciatu aut premio cuncta pervia esse*; *Bribery, or Punishment, will prevail with most Men, to betray whatsoever they know, or are concerned in.* And I do crave Liberty on this Occasion, to give Intimation, with the utmost Taciturness, as well as with all the

Modesty I can of a certain Person, whom I perfectly know, who by reason of his Education, his Conversation, and his Ignorance of the *British* Constitution, had imbibed and become possessed with very disloyal and wicked Principles; and for which he was also outrageously, as well intemperately zealous, until by the alone Grace of God, without the Application of any to him for the making him a Proselyte, he became a sincere Convert to the Person of his Sovereign, and to the *British* Monarchy. How that the said Person, during his being misled himself, and thereupon misleading others, had obtained the having more Mens Liberties, Estates, yea and Lives under his Hand and Power, than any one in the Three Kingdoms besides himself had. Yet that as no Person whatsoever, did ever come to suffer in his Freedom, Fortune, and much less in his Life, by the said Person's Indiscretion, and much less by his Falshood; so the said Gentleman is fully resolved, that how much soever he may reckon himself obliged, so to unkennel and detect those wicked Principles, (whensoever there shall be a convenient Opportunity for the doing of it) as that no Mischief (unless by a strange supineness in those at the Helm) shall arise hereafter, either to our Sovereign, or to the Monarchy; so he purposeth to be industriously careful, that all Families and Persons (save the wilfully Impenitent, and the obstinately Irreclaimable) shall be covered from the Aspersions and Reproaches, and Censures, to which they would be found obnoxious on former Accounts.

But to proceed to the discoursing a little of the other two ways, in and by which Persons and Affairs come to be detected, and thereupon betray'd, namely, that it doth either proceed from a *Lashness* and Unrepentiveness in some, or from a Vanity and Pride of being valued and esteemed in others. There are some Men, who

who through a looseness of Tongue, and from a meer love of Talk, cannot conceal their own personal Secrets, let them be never so important; and how then shall such be able to suppress the Secrets of others? The Tongues of some are according to the Phrase of the Apostle St. James, Chap. 2. Such unruly Evils, that it is neither practicable to restrain, or to tame them: Especially they who do inordinately love the Bottle, will when they fall under the Power of Wine, prove ready and inclined to detect whatsoever they know. For besides what the Proverb saith, that in *Vino Veritas*, that when Wine is in, Wit doth then become so far lost, as there is nothing which such can at that time conceal; so the Philosopher *Seneca*, *Epist.* 84. doth assure us, That *Onerati mero, quod suum alienumq; est pariter effundunt*; Such over whom Wine hath prevailed, will equally discover and betray both their own Secrets, and the Secrets of others. And through the Occasion and Influence, and by reason hereof, more have come to have their Persons and Transactions discovered and betray'd, and have thereupon been ruined, than ever were upon the Principle of Treachery, and the Motive of Mercenariness. So that Persons who love the Bottle, being chosen Ministers of State, ought either to renounce the drinking to an Intemperance, or else to resolve, while at their Wine, to talk of nothing save of *Bagatells*, which tho' it be difficult to perform, yet I knew it constantly practiced by Sir *Th. Arm.* The Third and last Occasion, as also the Inducement on which Secrets come to be detected, and even Persons sometimes betrayed to their utter Ruin, is a Vanity and Pride which some Men take, in the letting others know of their being made acquainted and trusted with the Knowledge of those things, which are concealed and kept reserved from the Generality. But forasmuch as they are commonly a little sort of People, or at the least of very mean

Mean Souls, who do either seek, or hope to beget an Esteem of themselves in any of common Sense, by so sneaking an Art or Practice, and that it is not likely that any honoured with the Dignity and Character of being a Privy Counsellor to Her Majesty should be guilty of such a thing, I shall content my self with having barely named it, and only add that Remark of Seneca's *Epist. 24. Malis Artibus, popularis fador queritur, ut ibi Applause of the People, is neither pursued, nor compassed, save by undue and unbecoming Methods.*

But to proceed to the bringing into View, and to the laying open a *Second Particular*, in reference whereunto a Minister of State will have occasion for the excise of his *Fidelity* towards his Sovereign, which will be found to lie in the Advice that he ought to give to him for the Government of his People, so that he may have Glory, and they be happy, if they will think themselves so. And as they are not to fail in the putting their Sovereign in mind, *non aliis esse principem gratiorem, quam qui maxime dominum graventur*, as Pliny saith in his *Panegyrick to Trajan*, that there are no Subjects to whom a King is so acceptable, as to those who do most hate a Tyrant; so the Counsel which thereupon they are to give their Prince, is, that he do govern them by and according to the known Laws, and that he have no Interest of his own seperate from, and much less opposite to theirs. By his doing whereof he is in the fairest way, that he possibly can be, not only for the preventing their rebelling, but for suppressing all Thoughts in them of wishing an other in his room. For what Tacitus *Historiar. lib. 1.* Reporteth *Galba* to have said concerning *Nero to Piso*, when he adopted him to be his Successor, deserveth the being taken notice of by them who come to have Supream Authority, viz. *Nero a Passimis semper desiderabitur; tibi Et tibi providendum est, ut etiam a bonis desideretur*, i. e. that it ought to be the

care

care of every wise Prince, that good Men may not wish for another in his stead, whatsoever they who are bad may do. And tho' the Advice to be given to a King or Queen should be, that they may have that universal and tender care for the Welfare and Prosperity of all their Subjects, which the Laws do require, yea and even to be better towards than they do direct, yet to be mindful of expressing their Respects to and for them, in proportion to their several Qualities and Stations. And forasmuch as the very meanest, have their Humours and Inclinations wherein they long to be gratified and pleased, it may not therefore be unbecoming those who are at the *Helm* of Affairs, to look after their being accommodated therein answerably to their Capacities and Understandings. Nor is it here unworthy of remark, what is still reported of that great and wise Statesman my Lord *Burley*, namely, that as he had always some Authors ready to write with Strength and Pertinency upon Subjects and Themes, whereby they of the better sort were to be both instructed and directed, so he was never without his *Ballad Makers*, who (as he gave them the *Cue*) were in their way to write suitably to the Genius and *Humour* of the Populace. And whosoever considereth that besides the Impression, which your *Rump Songs* and your *Lillibullero's* made on that Rank of People, how they were improved and made subservient by craftier and more cunning Men, to the bringing about and the producing very considerable Effects, such will not think the Management of that *Trash* and of those *Trifles*, to lie altogether out of the Province even of Ministers of State. But beyond this, Kings and Queens are never to be advised to go towards Subjects of the Inferior Rank. For their having taken care to provide for the meanest of their People, as well as the Circumstances of National Affairs, and the Wars they may be embarked in, will admit them to do, they are never to be advised

vifed to carefs them too much, and much lefs to place their Confidence in them, on the Score and Motive of the *Hoza's* they may make. For not only doth *Tacitus Annal. lib. 16.* fay, that *Plebi non Judicium, non Veritas, the Mob is generally void both of Judgement and of Sincerity*; but *Cicero, Orat pro. Planao* affureth us, *non est judicium in vulgo, non ratio & ex opinione plurima, ex veritate pauca judicat*; that the *Populace* is guided by *Humour, Noife, and Groundlefs Reports, and not by Judgement or Reason*. Nor will it therefore be inconvenient for a *Minifter of State*, to be laying fometimes before his *Sovereign*, what *Sextus Quintus Pope of Rome*, ufed commonly to fay in relation to that fort of Subjects, namely that *Bread and Cold Iron*, were the Means by which they were to be Governed, and that they who would not be gained to the Performance of their Duty by the *First*, fhould be compelled to do it by the *Second*. And I may be bold to assert that of *Livy* with refpect to that fort of Men, to be a well digefted and firm Truth, namely that *ex ferocibus univerfis, finguli metu fuo obedientes*: which I forbear to tranflate. Only do crave leave here to add, that one thing hath been too tamely connived at in *Great Britain*, whereof I know not whether a Parallel can be found in the World. Namely, that while they in *South Britain* who difsent and feperate from the Publick National Worfhip eftablifhed therein, are permitted to have their diftinct (and even Schifmatical) Communion, without the being thereupon made obnoxious to Civil Mulcts and Penalties, or even to the leaft Difurbance on the account of their Ways and Modes of Worfhip; how notwithstanding of the faid Lenity exercifed here, yet that they in *North-Britain* having in the time of Confufion at the Revolution obtained the *Presbyterian Ecclefiaftical Government*, and that Mode of Worfhip which they are fond of, and wedded unto, to be Erected among them, they

they will not so much as suffer any who are for the legally established Church Government and Worship of *South Britain*, so much as to exercise any Part of their Ministerial Function in that part of this *United Dominion*, without the harrassing of them either by Trick and *Chicane*, or by pretended Jurisdiction, in all the ways that they possibly can. Which as it sheweth the *Genius* of the Presbyterian Party, and what their Practice would be, were their Power answerable to their Inclination; so it should awaken all such, as are concerned either for the Credit of the National Church-Worship of *South-Britain*, or for Her Majesty's Honour, to see a Stop given unto, and a Remedy provided against his Exorbitant Proceedure in *North-Britain*. Which speaking more opprobriously, as well as clamourously, both against Her Majesty, and all who are Her Ministers of State, than I am by the most Acrimonious Words able to express, I shall therefore leave the Consideration of it to those, who are no less obliged in Conscience, than in Honour and Fidelity to concern themselves about it. And shall only subjoyn that of *Tacitus Historiar. lib. 4. Servitutem falso pacem appellant, they stile that their Peace, which is the Slavery of others.*

The next Particular in relation whereunto, there may be occasion for the exercise of the Fidelity of a Minister of State towards to his Sovereign, will respect his advising him, that what *Money's* soever are granted by Parliament, either for the Support of the Dignity of the of the Crown in all the Parts and Branches by which it is upheld and maintained, or for the sustaining and carrying on the War in which we are at present engaged, that all the said Moneys be duly and punctually applied to the Uses and Ends, for which they were allowed and given. And that as the Sovereign himself do break in upon no part thereof, either for the ministering to his own Personal and Private Occasions, and for the grati-
E
fying

fying his Particular Favourites; so that in the Place of
 covering those from the Inquisition and Animadversion
 of Parliament, who have wrongfully medled with and pre-
 verted them from the Uses, for which they were allotted
 and prescribed; that Her Majesty shall not only counte-
 nance and encourage the House of Commons (from which
 the said Grants do originally proceed) to make a Narrow
 Inspection, both after the Misapplication of them, and
 also after those, who have been either the Author's there-
 of, or accessory thereunto; but that Her Majesty shall
 likewise, and that with all the earnestness She possibly
 can, recommend the doing thereof to the said House.
 For what *Tacitus Hist. lib. 4.* hath so long ago obser-
 ved, is still, and will at all times be found true, *viz.* That
Publicas, privatasque opes, & immensam pecuniam, are
in that Case, ferro validiorem; that an Exchequer abound-
 ing in Silver and Gold, and such Grants and Contribu-
 tions thereof, as may be made by an opulent and wil-
 ling People, will be of much more significancy to the
 conquering of an Enemy, or to the bringing him to a
 Peace, that may be honourable and safe, than either
 Iron, or Steel are. So that Money being the *Sinews* of
 War, the Misapplication thereof, is the maiming and
 crippling of the Government in the Prosecution thereof.
 But tho' they who be Ministers of State, can by their
 Advice to their Sovereign, do no more in this Particu-
 lar, than what hath been here imitated, yet as they are
 Members of the *Houses of Parliament*, and especially
 as any of them are so of the *House of Commons*; there
 are other things which may there fall within their Cir-
 cle, wherein by the giving their Opinions, they may
 both manifest their Fidelity to Her Majesty, and also
 their Care of, and their Compassion for their Country.
 As particularly, that whatsoever Taxes are granted, may
 be laid so equally as to affect all the Subjects alike, as
 much as is possible to do it; so that if a distinguishing
 Care

Care be taken for the easing of any in Publick Impositions, it may be extended to those of *Agriculture, Manufacture and Traffick*, these being not only the Springs and Means of our Wealth, but the *Source* of our Subsistence. And as with relation to the *Latter*, it will be no reproach to us to learn of our Neighbours the *Dutch*, who under all the vast Impositions, which they are forced at this Juncture to lay upon the Subjects of that Republick, they do nevertheless keep Manufacture and Commerce, not only from the being overloaded, but easy above what could be thought practicable for them to do; so with respect to the *Former*, the whole that I shall presume to offer here in reference thereunto, shall be what the Ambassador's of an oppressed Prince said to *Anthony*, *If O Emperor, thou wilt have double Taxes from us, thou must help us to double Springs and Harvests.* And tho' it be not pleasant to add, yet I cannot omit the doing it, how that as there is neither that Care, nor that Fidelity has been exercised, which ought to have been, either in the Collection, or in the Application, of the many and various Impositions Parliamentarily granted since the Revolution; so there hath during all that time, been not only a shameful but an affected Neglect, in the rendring the *Taxes equal* which were to arise from the Subjects. Yea tho' both the Malady and the Remedy thereof, were in a great measure laid open in a very Pertinent Discourse, printed 1702. Stiled *an Essay concerning the necessity of Equal Taxes*, yet no use previously to the sitting of this Parliament hath been ever made of it, unless to encourage and confirm, that no less unwise, than unrighteous Proceedure. But this being not only a Digression, but wholly alien from the Subjects, to which I have confined my Discourfing of, I shall therefore abandon the saying any more concerning it here, and shall with the profoundest Submission, give up the Consideration and Care thereof to the Wis-

dom and Authority of those, whom it doth concern, to make Provision in reference thereunto.

A *Third* thing, wherein a *Minister of State*, especially at this juncture, will have even too much Occasion for the Exercise of his Fidelity to his Sovereign, will be in the Advices he giveth with respect to the *Non-jurors*, and to those who are commonly stiled *Jacobites*. And this being a tender Point, I shall therefore take care to speak of it with unexceptionable Modesty, as well as with the profoundest Submission. In order whereunto, I shall premise some things concerning the *Non-jurors*, which I think are not to be denied in consistency with common Reason. Whereof the *first* is, That they ought indubitably to be accounted a conscientious sort of Men, and that their forbearing to swear Allegiance to the Government doth not proceed from rebellious Principles, but from a Fear and Belief that they should sin against God in case they should venture to do so. For being rational Men, as well as others are, it is the greatest Absurdity imaginable, to think they should chuse Sufferings meerly for the sake of Sufferings. And that they should on the alone Motives of Honour or Stubborness, not only chuse to be precluded from all hopes either of Ecclesiastical, or of Civil Employes and Preferments, (being thro' their Qualifications, both as they are Christians and *English* men, as capable of them as any of their Fellow Subjects are) but also to be turned out of what they had formerly been in the Legal Possession of, and to become exposed to those Inconveniencies and Losses besides, which I shall not here mention. Nor can that Objection, which some unthinking People (to say no worse) do use against them, make any Impression to their Prejudice, upon any who are either Men of Sense, or of Conscience, viz. that they are mistaken and misled in their Principles. Seeing, admitting it were so, yet

yet a great difference is to be always allowed between Mistake and Malice; nor are they who are misled merely through the Weakness of their Understandings, to be treated as they deserve to be who offend from a Stubbornness of Will. For whensoever any have done their Duty as well as they can, in order to their being rightly informed, their Failurs will, by God himself, be no longer imputed to Perversness, but to Human Infirmary. Forasmuch as that may lawfully, and without Sin, be done by one, which cannot be done by another, without the provoking of God, and the defiling his own Conscience. And this the Apostle St. Paul hath not only determined in the general, in saying *Whatsoever is not of Faith (i. e. from a Perswasion of the Lawfulness of it) is Sin*, (namely, to him that doth it) and that therefore *every Man is to be fully perswaded in his own mind*, Rom. xiv. 5, 23. but he hath brought it down to a particular Instance, in that plain and full Declaration of his, *I know, and am perswaded by the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of it self, but to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean*, ibid. v. 14. For to commit what we judge offensive to the Deity, tramples as much on the respect we owe to God, as if the thing it self were in the Number of what is most detestible to him. Seeing whosoever acts in Defiance of his Conscience, casts off all Reverence of God whose Deputy Conscience is. This the Light of Nature teacheth us, as well as that of Revelation. So that *Aristotle Eth. lib. 4. cap. 9.* plainly tells us, *Ἐὶ δ' ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀνομιὰν αἰχρῆς, &c.* *It's all one whether things be really Evil, or do only appear so, for neither of them are to be done.*

The Second is, That whatsoever Mistakes the Non-jurors may be under, with respect to the Government as it is now Established, yet that they do still remain un-

unchangeable in their Principles of Loyalty unto, and
 of Zeal for the Monarchy of *Great-Britain*. It being
 for and in behalf of that, that they have for almost
 Twenty Two Years submitted to bear Reproaches, and
 to undergo Calamities. Whereas had they been of
Republican Principles, or had believed the *Original*, as
 well as the *Disposal* of all Government to be lodged
 in the *People*; and that it is committed to them, by
 God, not only to depose Regnant Princes, but to alter
 Constitutions, when and how they please, in case they
 think themselves aggrieved under one, and do fancy a
 prospect of mending their Condition under another;
 the said *Non-jurors* neither would, nor in consistency
 with common Sense could, have declined the behaving
 themselves as those have done; especially under all the
 Temptations thereunto, which whatsoever is valuable
 in this World did accost and assault them with. And
 that when they neither had, nor could have, any thing
 in view to prevent their submitting unto, and comply-
 ing with them, save the alone Authority of God over-
 ruling their Consciences, and thereupon both that Peace
 of Mind here which inseparably attendeth upright
 and sincere Obedience to, and that Happiness hereafter
 wherewith it will not miss the being rewarded by
 him. And if it may administer no Offence to compare
 one Party with another, I should think that Party de-
 serveth to be had in most esteem, who do reckon it
 their duty to live peaceably under whatsoever Govern-
 ment is by the Providence of God erected over them, tho'
 they cannot, by their swearing Fealty and Allegiance to
 it become admitted to share in those Offices and Employ-
 ments, which would bring them considerable secular
 Accruments and temporal Profits; while they of the
 other Party do, by their Swearing, come to be admitted
 into those Places of civil Trust and earthly Advantage, as
 that they do thereby not only grow rich, but do prey upon
 the

the Government it self, notwithstanding that in the said time their avowed Principles are, that they may lawfully both make Insurrection against, and also subvert the Government, in Case they think themselves oppressed by it, which they have withal taken care by their very Principles, that they are to be the alone Judges, whether they be so or not.

The *Third* is, That whatsoever Reasons the Non-jurors do pretend to be guided by in their Behaviour towards the present Government, they are such as are superstructed upon, and do naturally flow from the Doctrines of *Non-resistance and Passive Obedience*, which were not only delivered to them by their *Mother*, the Church of England, for the Regulation of their Obedience to their legitimate and legal Kings, but were also imposed by a *Statute Law* in the 13th of K. Ch. II. Yea such of them as are Ecclesiasticks, had in pursuance of the Act of the 14th Ch. II. for the Uniformity of publick Prayer, and for Ordaining and Consecrating Bishops, Priests, Deacons, &c. Declared, that it is not lawful, upon any Pretence whatsoever, to take Arms against the King; and that they abhorred that traitorous Position of taking Arms by his Authority against his Person, or against those that are Commissionated by him. And as they have hitherto embraced no other Tenets for their Guidance in their Duty to their Sovereigns, nor can do so until they have disclaimed the Doctrine of the Church, whereof they are Sons and Members; so they do not find that they can act otherwise than they do, unless they should both renounce the Authority, and forfeit the Blessing of their said *Mother*. And as they dare not borrow Rules of Life, from such as do make secular Interest to be Godliness, nor Coin as well as imbihe new Principles from new Occasions; so they do hope that it will be accounted no Crime in them, that they are not willing to be cut or stretched

to the Dimensions of those who can contract or enlarge themselves, as they do find most accommodated to their lying easie, and their growing and being warm in the World. For the worst things which the bitterest Enemies of the *Non-jurors* can justly say of them, are, (which I mentioned once before) that tho' as *Tacitus Histor. lib. 4.* expresseth it, they do *Bonos Principes voto expetere*, Pray for the having good Kings; Yet that they do judge it to be their Duty, *Malos tolerare*, To submit patiently to such as are bad: And that it is withal their Opinion, as the same *Tacitus Histor. lib. 1.* saith, *Minore discrimine sami principem, quam quari*; Better to acquiesce in a Prince in Possession, who may be none of the best, than to go about the pulling him down, and the setting up another, even in case they were assured of mending their Condition by it. And that every *Non-juror* is of *Seneca's* mind, *Lib. 1. de Ira*, *optimum est Deum, quo auctore cuncta proveniunt, sine murmuratione comitari, & pati quod emendare non possis*; which I shall not translate. Of none whereof, do the *Non-jurors* see any reason, why either they themselves should be ashamed, or why any other should blame them.

Nor should it be a matter of Surprise to any, that they who heretofore professed to be of the same Principles with the *Non-jurors*, do more malign as well as defame them, for continuing to hold them, than even the most inveterate Enemies of the Church do; in that by their Perseverance in their ancient Principles, and their continuing to act answerably thereunto, they do put those to shame, (tho' they cannot convert them, unless they had the World to give them) who have found out other Measures for their Conduct in Preaching, Printing and Practising, than they once had. And for these Mens being so industrious to bring over *Non-jurors* to close with them in their modern Sentiments,

and

and that whom they cannot gain by Menaces, they strive to make Profelites of, by their seeming to compassionate their Want and Penury, (tho' their true meaning be to have them fed and cloathed at the Price and Cost of their Consciences) the Apostle St. Paul hath given us an account of the Reasons of both. Of the first, *Some preach Christ of Contention, thinking to add Affliction to my Bonds*, Philip. i. 16. and of the second in his saying, *As many as desire to make a fair Shew in the Flesh, they constrain you to be Circumcised, &c. and desire to have you circumcised, that they may glory in your Flesh*, Gal. 5. 12, 13.

Now after these few *Premises*, with relation to such as are *Non-jurors*, I shall without the entring into the Merit or the Demerit of their Cause, proceed to the laying with all Humility, before those who are Ministers of State, as well what their Fidelity to their Sovereign requireth of them, as what in Lenity to the said *Non-jurors* is therewith consistent in the Advices they are to give Her Majesty, with respect to them. And whereas they know themselves incapable (according to the Rules observed by all Constitutions whatsoever) of being placed in Offices of Trust and Emolument under the Government; they therefore neither are, nor can be so void of Sense, as either to expect, or to desire, that any in the *Ministry* about Her Majesty, should counsel Her to employ them in Stations of that kind. Yea, tho' they both know and avow, that their steddly Principles are to live peaceably; yet they are so far from reckoning it to be any part of the Compassion which these *Ministers* should have for them, and much less a part of the Duty which the said *Ministers* owe to Her Majesty, as (on the Profession of those *Non-jurors* to live quietly) to overlook and neglect their Conduct and Behaviour; that on the contrary, they should neither believe those *Ministers* to be faithful to the Queen, nor to be good

F

Men,

Men, should they omit the having an Observant, and a strict Eye over and upon them, in the whole Course of their Civil and Political Dememeanour and Carriage.

But the few things which they do humbly conceive to be as well a part of the *Fidelity* which *Ministers of State* are to pay to their Sovereign; as a Branch, not only of that Tenderness, but of that Justice which the said *Ministers* owe to them, are these briefly here sub-joyn'd. *First*, That they would not fail in Counselling Her Majesty against the receiving Impressions to their prejudice upon Whispers and Reports. And that She would admit of no relations on which to entertain Thoughts of Severity towards them, save what are founded upon such *Overt-Acts*, and those to be legally proved, as the Laws have enacted to be Criminal. Forasmuch as it was an Old Greek Advice, long before it was Fathered on *Machiavel*, *Calumniare semper adest*, *calumniare* stoutly and something will stick: In that how perfectly soever the Wound may be cured, yet there will remain a Scar; and that tho' the Dirt thrown upon any he wip'd away with never so much Care, there will always be left some Stain and Sullage behind. And if we do not only consider the Depravedness of the present Age, but that *calumniare audacter*, &c. is become both a principal Part of the practical Religion, and the chiefest Ingredient into the Politicks of some sort of People; Her Majesty is therefore to be the more cautioned and advised against what others are defamed by, unless She have a previous Information of the Witnesses by whom it can be fully and legally proved. And for any Minister of State to behave himself otherwise, even in the Case of *Non-jurors*, would be not only to act worse and more illegally towards them, than is consistent with the Laws of the Constitution; but it were to act in a Method against them, which Renouncers, as well as Blasphemers of the Great God, who is King of

of Kings, are covered and protected from, and that not only by the Laws of these Dominions, but by the Laws of God Himself.

A *Second* thing which the *Non-jurors* do humbly conceive, to be not only consistent with, but to belong essentially to that *Fidelity*, which a *Minister of State* is sacredly to observe in the *Advices* he giveth to his Sovereign, is, That if any within the List and Number of *Non-jurors*, or of such as are stiled *Jacobites*, be found legally guilty of Criminal Offences against the Government, that such alone shall both only bear the Infamy, and undergo the Punishments thereof: And that their Fact or Facts, be they never so ignominious and heinous, shall not be construed to affect the Party to which they are reckoned to belong, nor to fasten any Blot of Suspicion upon them. Seeing no Party of any Denomination whatsoever, is in Equity and Justice to be charged with the Obliquity of the Practices of such as are said to be of their Stile and *Category*, further than the Principles of the said Party lead them thereunto, and justify them therein: Otherwise all Civil, as well as Ecclesiastical Societies, were not only to be branded with the Reproach and Scandal, but would be also accusable of the Guilt resulting from, and appendant to the Offences of all such, who of their respective Societies, stand convicted of having Criminally Transgressed. For as Parties are to be no otherwise judged of, than according to their professed Principles, unless they be found universally involved in some Criminal *Overt-acts*; so there are not only some of Parties infected with the worst Principles, who through their Constitution, Education and Conversation, &c. do prove better Men than their Principles would guide and influence them to be; but there are also too many to be found among those Parties, whose Principles are Religious and Loyal, who nevertheless, thro' natural and

con-

contracted Errors and Vices, do run into and perpetrate Crimes, which are prohibited and disallowed by their Principles. And all that I shall farther add, with Relation to this *Second Particular* concerning *Non-jurors*, is, That as for *Ministers of State* to believe otherwise of them, than appeareth by *Overt-acts*, is to fall under the Reflection which *Tacitus Historiar. lib. 4.* maketh on the People of *Rome* upon a certain Occasion, viz. *Dum timet, credebat; What they greatly feared, they easily believed:* And then as to that sort of People, who do endeavour to possess those Ministers with such an Opinion, I shall only apply to them that of *Cicero, Tuscul. 1. Est proprium stultitia aliorum vitia cernere, oblivisci suorum, It is an Evidence of great Folly, to be adverting on other Mens Faults, and in the mean time to forget their own.*

The *Third* and last thing, which I desire, with a most profound Submission, to lay before the present *Minister of State*, with respect to the *Non-jurors*, is, That tho' the said *Non-jurors* do, with great Thankfulness to God, and with a high Esteem both of the Wisdom and of the Humanity of these Nations, recognize and acknowledge the Mercifulness, as well as the Equity of the *Laws*, by and according to which these Dominions are Govern'd; yet how upon their Knowledge that what hath been, may again be, and thro' their having also found, that there are some who have been endeavouring to bring such barbarous Severities upon them, which are not only disagreeable to the Temper and merciful Genius of the *English* to inflict upon, or to render any obnoxious unto; but for which there was never here a *Precedent*, save when the usurped Domination over this Kingdom, was in the vilest and most Tyrannous Hands, that it was possible for God, in his permissive Providence, to suffer a Nation to fall under. For the *Rump*, after they had Murthered the King,
(and

(and what Impiety and Salvageness were not to be expected from them, after the *Parricide* they had perpetrated on that excellent Prince) did Frame an *Engagement* for the Abjuration of the whole Royal Family of *Steward*, and that with no less Penalty to be inflicted upon such as should refuse to *subscribe* it, than that they should be accounted and held *excluded from the Benefit and Protection of the Laws*; that is, That they should not only be deprived of the Rights, Properties and Privileges of *English Free-Men*, and rendered obnoxious to whatsoever those pretending to Power, could at their Pleasure, without Law, inflict upon them; but be rendred also exposed to the Arbitrary Malice, or to the wanton Cruelty of their private and personal Enemies. Nor should I have called over this unparallel'd *Precedent* of inhuman and barbarous Rage, had not a certain *Writer*, in a *Book* publish'd in the Year 1702, not only menaced the *Jacobites* with the like Treatment, in case they continued to refuse to take the *Oaths* to the present *Government*, but he also therein endeavoured to have prevailed with the *Legislative Power* of this Nation, to have Copied and Enacted against the present *Non-jurors*, what the fore-mentioned *Regicides* had contrived and framed against the Old *Cavilliers*. Who the *Author* of the said Villanous *Paper* of 1702 was, I do suppose there are few need Information, his sanguinary Principles, as well as his Stile, being sufficient to discover him; and should there be any who require farther Intelligence concerning him, I must beg their excusing me from giving it; and that in the Room thereof they will be contented with my assuring them, that in case the said *Author* do ever come to be Tried for his Life, there will be found Ancient Laws enough to affect and reach him in reference thereunto, without borrowing a *Precedent* from those *Regicides*, the *Rump*, for the doing of it. And tho' I do

do heartily deprecate the framing of any new *Precedents* for the taking away the Lives of the greatest Criminals, yet of all Men that *Author* would have least cause to complain, should it come in his Case to be so, in that the common Opinion of Mankind doth fully agree here with that of the *Poet*. Namely,

— *Nec lex est justior ulla,
Quam necis Artifices, arte perire sua.*

his But seeing, *Fas est ab hoste doceri*, that it is not only lawful, but that is also every Man's Duty to learn Equity and Justice, both from an Enemy, and from the worst of Men; I shall therefore briefly bring into view the Practice of *Oliver Cromwell* towards the *Old Cavaliers*, during the whole time of *Usurpation*: Who, tho' he knew the Royal Party better than any Man in the Nation, and that they were not only unchangeable in their Principles of Loyalty, and thereupon irreconcilable Enemies to him and his Government, but that he also found the *Engagement* which the *Rump* had *Fram'd*, to be in actual Being and Force against them; yet that he not only superceded and abolished it, but that he first made a personal *Ordinance* of his own, and afterwards obtained it to be form'd into a *Law*, that *no general and promissory Oaths and Engagements, Enacted and Imposed under Penalties, Forfeitures and Losses, should be Extended unto, or Executed on any Man what-soever*. And in this he continued firm and steddily during the whole time of his *Usurpation*, whereby, as the then Loyal Party were preserved from the Temptation of Damning their Souls, for the saving their Bodies and Estates, so he also found his own Interest and Safety therein: In that none of the *Old Cavaliers*, during the whole time of his *Usurpation*, were put upon the Extremity of preventing their own Ruin, by their

their destroying of him. Seeing, as there is nothing truer in the general, than that *Contempsit omnes ille, quæ vitam prius*, He may be Master of any Man's Life, who is ready and willing to sacrifice his own; so there was never a Person in the World to whom more than to Oliver, the Reply of Sulpitius Asper the Centurion to Nero, when question'd by him, why he had Conspired against him, might have been made with more Pertinency and Justice, viz. *Non aliter tot flagitiis ejus subvenire potuisse*, as Tacitus Annal. lib. 15. expresth it, That there was no other way left by which to give Check to his Crimes and Villanies, but by destroying him. Whereunto I crave leave to add, That as the whole Security which the said Oliver Cromwell look'd after, next to his own Care and Vigilance, against those who continued then Loyal to their Sovereign and the Royal Family, was to cover himself by a Law against their attempting his Death by War, or by Plots, declared and legally proveable from and by Overt-acts: So instead of subjecting those to the Payment of double Taxes, who would not take the Oaths of Fidelity to him, he provided even by an Act of Parliament, That such Ministers of the Gospel, who had been turned out of their Livings for refusing them, should be allowed the fifth Part of what arose from the Benefices whereof they had been possessed. In which, whether Policy or Lenity, I do wish that some, whom I do not care to name, because I cannot do it without too much Acrimony, had been careful to imitate him.

A Fourth thing wherein a Minister of State may have occasion for the exercise of his Fidelity to his Sovereign, will be in his advising him concerning what may belong to the Marine. For as all Her Majesties European Dominions are so many Islands seperated from all parts of the neighbouring Continent (for so they were many ages ago exprest to be, *Divisos toto orbe Britannos*) so these

these Kingdoms, are not only indebted to their *Marine* Strength, for their Security against the being invaded and subdued by Potent adjoining Nations on the Continent; but they do also owe their Precedency to some greater Nations (than they are) in Opulency and Wealth, to their Traffick and Commerce by Navigation, which can be no otherways covered and protected, than by a *Naval* Strength superior to that, either of a Trading, or of a Privateering Nation. Nor can our Plantations in other Parts of the World, receive either Benefit by us, or be of Advantage to us, nay nor escape the being ravished and conquered from us, if our Martial Fleets be suffered to sink and decay, below what our Rivals in Marine Power continue to be. And yet it hath been the unhappy Fate of these Kingdoms since the Revolution, to have with respect to their Naval Military Power (to say nothing here of the other Branches of our Navigation) been wonderfully overlookt and neglected. The blame and fault whereof, tho' all Men of Sense and Veracity, do ascribe it unto, and charge it upon the late King *William*, yet they cannot agree from what Principles, and on what Motives, he was not only accessory thereto, but the Author and Promoter thereof. Some being willing to resolve it into a fondness he had for service at Land, where he himself could be present and command; while others think they have Reasons warranting the attributing it to a Love which he retained for the Dutch beyond what he was ever brought to entertain for the British. And that on his foreseeing how sooner or latter, there would unavoidably be a Rupture between us and them, he thereupon made the earliest and best Provision he could, against their receiving Dammage, and our attaining Success, in case that the Alliance which was then between us, should come to be exchanged into Hostility. For as he very well knew (upon reasons which I shall

not

not presume here to mention) that he neither should, nor could leave Heirs behind him of his own Body, (which in case he had either had a Prospect, or so much as a Hope of, he would undoubtedly have proved more careful of the Marine Power of these Nations, than he was) he therefore upon many Inducements leading him to wish the Future Welfare of those States, did whatsoever he could (while he was living) do that for them, which whensoever War should arise between us and them, might serve to obviate and prevent their coming to be beaten by us. But from whatsoever Principles of Motives, that shameful Neglect (I was about to have used more Picquant Words) did arise and proceed, it hath been the unhappiness of these Nations to feel the Effects, as well as the Consequences thereof. Seeing besides our being by those Unfortunate Measures, not only disabled from doing those things against our Publick Enemy by a Warlike Naval Strength, which would have more nearly touched him, and have been more mischievous and fatal to him, than all which by our Land Forces, we have been in a condition to execute against him in *Brabant* and *Flanders*, we have also sustained Losses by his Privateers, beyond what is decent for a Private Person to mention, and is only fit for the Inquisition of the Parliament; but we have likewise moreover from that Source of intended Mischief, as well as wilful Neglect, undergone and suffered Great Irruptions upon our Trade and Commerce by our good Confederates the *Dutch*. Whereof as a brief View and Detale was in the Year 1695, given in a Discourse stiled *the Depredations of the Dutch*; so an Account thereof could be now much enlarged, if the present Posture of Affairs in *Europe* would conveniently admit of a discovery of them. But I shall only on this Occasion add that proverbial saying of the ancient Greeks *Ἀπὸς πελά-
γος ὅταν πρὸς ἑοικέσται*, *When the Oak is fallen, every one*

gets some Wood. Whereunto I cannot forbear subjoyn-
ing that of Tacitus, *In vita Agricola, nihil profici pa-*
tientia, nisi ut graviora ex facili tolerantibus impera-
turi, which I shall no otherwile English, *Than that*
there are some Men, whom too much Patience embol-
deneth.

But as the Ground-work and Foundation of these
ruinous Mischiefs to our Naval Strength were not on-
ly laid, but advanced to that degree, before Her Ma-
jesty's Accession to the Throne, that neither Her Com-
passion, Application nor Wisdom, could find out effe-
ctual Remedies against them; so neither Her former
Ministry, nor the foregoing Parliaments under Her
Reign, to whom She recommended the providing Re-
lief against what would at last ensue thereupon, thought
fit to set themselves about the doing thereof, in that
effectual manner, which they ought to have done. But
whether that proceeded from their thinking it past cure,
or from their judging it to be for their Interest to keep
the Patient languishing in hope of Fees, I shall not pre-
sume to determine. However, as the Case, with re-
lation thereunto which lieth before the present Parlia-
ment, is deplorable beyond Expression, and that as
well on the account of the vast Debts due to the *Ma-*
rine in the several Parts and Branches thereof, as be-
cause of the Decay of our Fleets of War in the Num-
ber of Ships of Strength, and also of brave Seamen
to be employed upon them. So I neither will, nor dare
publish my Thoughts about any of these things, but
do, with the profoundest Submission I possibly can, fur-
render them to the Consideration of the present Parlia-
ment, which I do believe to have that Zeal for the Ho-
nour of the Crown, and that Pity for their Country,
as that they will not fail to do it, if it be practicable.
And I shall only recommend two Passages of Tacitus
Hist. lib. i. for the quickning them therein: Whereof
the

the one is, *Nec cunctatione opus, ubi perniciosior sit quies, quam temeritas*, That things hazardous to be set about, are to be executed with speed: The other is, *Festinati-
one tutius, ubi factio magis quam consulto opus est*, That there are Cases, about which it is foolish to be advising, but there should be acting. And I do wish they be kept from that, which the same *Tacitus Historiar. lib. 4.* saith, *Nec perinde dijudicari potest, quid optimum factu fuerit, quam pessimum fuisse quod factum est*, i. e. When Men are in a Condition that they know not what is best, they usually do that which is worst. But tho' speed be absolutely necessary, yet I do not know whether the Degeneracy of the present Age will admit of too much Severity. Seeing *Tacitus* (whom I do chuse often to speak by, not through Pedantry, but because he may deserve to be heard, when I do not) tells us, *Hist. lib. 1.*, that there was a time, *When nocuit antiquus rigor & nimia severitas, cui jam pares non sumus*, i. e. There are Seasons when Justice must give place to depraved Customs and Manners. But the performing hereof being beyond the power of all those who are now in the Ministry, whether they be taken apart, or together, I shall therefore lay nothing of all this either before him, for whose Service this Paper is principally intended, or before those who bear the same Character which he doth. Only I do, with great Humility, lay both before them and him, that they will not be wanting to advise Her Majesty, never to trust the Command at Sea, and over Her Land Forces in one and the same Hand. That is, that as She never doth commit the Command of them to the same Individual Person, so that She may never venture to place them in those who are united to one another, either by the Bonds of Relation, or by the Ties of particular Friendship. Yea, it would be highly prudential in a Prince or Princess never to place Armies or Fleets, so much as to be commanded by him,

on whose Counsel He or She do chiefly rely, with respect to the Administration of their Government. Nor can any better Advice be given by any Counsellor to a King or Queen, than that a Minister of State, and a Favourite, should never be the same; and that as they are not to Envy one another, so they ought not to break in upon the Province of one another: But as the one should be contented with lying in the Lap, so the other should account himself abundantly honoured in the being Entrusted to preserve the Safety, and to promote the Glory of the Crown, and to take care of the Peace and Prosperity of his Sovereign's Dominions.

A Fifth Particular about which, and wherein a Minister will have Occasion for the displaying his Fidelity to Her Majesty, in the Advices he layeth before Her, will respect and have relation to those who are, or shall, at any time, be our *Allies*, and especially who are our *Confederates* in the present War. And as with reference to them, a Person of the aforesaid Character, is always to Counsel his Sovereign, to make good and to perform whatsoever hath been stipulated and promised by Her on the Part of these Dominions; so they are not to omit the Advising Her Majesty, to Demand and to Expect from them, a faithful Accomplishment of whatsoever they have by Treaties made with this Crown, obliged themselves to fulfil and to perform. Especially seeing all that in the Virtue thereof, we can exact or expect from them, will lie in a very narrow Room, in case it be true, which the Author of the *Essay concerning the Necessity of equal Taxes* teacheth us, p. 26. namely, *That for the many Millions expended by us, we have not in any Treaty with our Allies been allowed one favourable Article, at least not one that we could be trusted with the Knowledge of.* But that being a Matter which the present House of Commons seemeth to have at Heart, and whereof they have

given

given Testimony in the very first *Address*, they have had Occasion to make to Her Majesty, it would be high Presumption in me to offer any thing in relation thereunto, save the commending the Wisdom, Loyalty, and *English* Zeal of that House, in what they have therein Humbly and Dutifully Desired of Her Majesty. Only there are Two Things, which I hope may be mentioned by a private Man, without Administring Ground of Offence to any : Especially seeing that as they be but briefly suggested, so that likewise shall be done with the utmost Modesty, and with the profoundest Submission. Whereof the *one* is, that whereas among those stiled our *Allies*, there are diverse, who as they ought rather to be stiled our *Pensioners*, than our *Confederates*; so it may not be unworthy the Inquiry of the Parliament, as well at what *Rates* we bought them; as how they have answered the Sums and Prices, which we have disbursed and expended for and upon them. Seeing, if what we have bestowed upon them, was only for the Purchasing their being *Neutral* between us and the Common Enemy, it will be found that we have allowed too much for it; and if we did it for the obtaining their effectual Assistance, there will a Failure be found in some of them, as to the making good their Bargain, at *best*, with respect to the Degree and Measure, which we were made to hope and to expect from them. The other is, That it may not be below the Inspection of the Parliament, whether the Terms on which we have stipulated with a certain *King*, and with a certain *Prince* (whom I do forbear to Name) for the bringing them to be our *Confederates* in this War, are not of that vast Advantage to them while it doth continue, that they thereupon do find it to be their Interest to prolong and to spin it out, rather than to exert themselves with that Vigour they might for the putting a speedy Period to it, by an Honourable
and

and Universal Peace. Especially in that as those Princes are assured of the large Sums and great Profits which they do derive from us by the means of the War; so they have Arts and Ways of taking care and providing, that no such Losses or Damages shall overtake them by it, as may be so impoverishing to them, as that which they obtain from us is serviceable to the making them Rich and Opulent. Of all which the Parliament will need no other Demonstration and Conviction, save the having those Alliances communicated to them. Nor will that be denied to them, in case they desire it. Whereunto the whole I will subjoin shall be, that were we to judge of the insinuated King and Prince by their Conduct these last Two Campaigns (if they did not behave themselves so upon worse Principles, Motives and Prospects) is what *Tacitus Annal. lib. 3.* brings in *Silius's* Saying of the *Admiral* *Quanto pecunia dices, tanto magis imbelles*, That by how much richer they are become (through the vast Sums they have received from us) they are grown the more Emasculated and Cowardly. And I may add hereunto with relation to the King, (whose Name I suppress) on the Account of his Carriage the very last Campaign, what the same *Tacitus Historiar. lib. 3.* saith of *Fabius Valens*, *Quod inter ancipitia deterrimum, nec ausus est satis, nec providit*, which instead of Englishing, shall only take notice, that as the meaning of the first part of that Observation hath been already verified concerning us and some others; so it is not improbable but that the said King may in time come to experience the Truth of the second Part of it himself. And should the Apology and Excuse, which hath been made in his Favour, be true, (which I will not say but that it is) viz. That his Troops refused to march, it doth only verifie what the same *Tacitus Historiar. lib. 2.* observeth, That *Quantumcunque hebes ad sustinendum laborem miles, tam*

to ad discordias promptior; By how much Souldiers grow the more cowardly, they do betome commonly the mere mutinous.

And I could wish, that I had not reason farther to subjoin, that the Behaviour of our own Troops, and especially of the *Imperial* Forces, had not in a great Measure been such, as if they had intended to confirm the *Spaniards* in their Alliance to King *Philip*, instead of endeavouring to bring them to an Acknowledgment of *Charles* for their Sovereign. For unless Insolence, Plunder, Rapine and Sacrilege of all kinds, were proper Methods for the alienating them from the former, and for the reconciling them to the latter; the way of doing the one and the other, hath been both ill adjusted, and as ill pursued by the Confederate Forces there. And except even the perpetrating of Mischief for the meer sake of Mischief (as without assigning other Instances thereof, the burning the *Palace of Toledo* was) could conduce to the compassing what the said Forces were sent thither to effect, there hath been a wonderful Deficiency, with respect to the Use and Application of the most proper and natural Means, towards our being successful in what we had projected. Nor are we therefore to think it strange, that under all the Opportunities which have been administred to the *Spaniards*, for their renouncing of *Philip*, and their declaring for *Charles*, they should have acted in the manner they have done, and not in the way which we fancied they would. For if ever that which *Tacitus*, in the *Life of Agricola*, makes *Gallicus* the Britain say of the *Romans* to his People, was again repeated and verified, namely, *Si locuples hostis avari si pauper, ambitiosi*, which I do forbear to translate, those *Spaniards* which own King *Philip*, may, without Exaggeration, pronounce to have been lately reacted by the Confederate Forces among them.

The

The Sixth and the last Particular (that I shall mention) wherein a Minister of State may have Occasion for the Exercise of his Fidelity towards his Sovereign, will be in the *Advices* which he giveth unto, and layeth before him, for the procuring and obtaining of an Honourable Peace. For War not being the Matter of a rational Choice, in case it can be avoided with Honour and Safety; it can therefore only be wisely and justly undertaken and pursued, when it is embark'd in and continued, for the the escaping of Thralldom, or of some Evil that approacheth to it. Nor is there, as *Tacitus Annal. lib. 13.* expresseth it, a People, (unless it be furious and mad) *Ad eo in arma promptus, ut non idem pretium quistis, quam periculi malis.* Who would not chuse to enjoy what they desire and possess by Peace, rather than to look after the Preservation of it by Hostility. And the Design of a just War, being as *Livy* phraseth it, *Servitutis depulsio.* The Prevention of Slavery, it is then only to be engaged in and upheld, when as the same *Livy* wordeth it, *Pax servientibus gravior, quam liberis bellum.* Peace is even worse to such who submit to be Slaves, than War can be to those, who are resolved either to maintain their Freedom, or to perish. And who have in that Case, (that I may use the words of *Tacitus Annal. lib. 14.*) taken it for their Motto, *Vincendum, vel cadendum.* To be Destroyed, rather than to Conquer. And as the same *Tacitus Annal. lib. 3.* telleth us how the Thracians gave in Charge to their Ambassadors, to tell the Romans who began to treat them ill; *Amicitiam, obsequiumque memoraturos, & mensurabatur, si nullo novo onere tantarentur, sin ut villis servitium indiceretur, esse sibi servum & Inventatem, & promptum libertati aut ad mortem animum,* whereof I shall give no Translation, but in the stead thereof shall only observe, That Brave Men will chuse either War or Death, rather than to become Slaves. Forasmuch then, as that

the

not

the ultimate Design of this War, (at least with respect to us) is the procuring a Safe and Honourable Peace, and not the putting off that Power for the Oppressing and Enslaving of *Europe* into the Hands of others, which we are endeavouring to disable the *French* from a Capacity of effecting, so whensoever we do judge that such a Peace may be had, we are no longer obliged, by *Alliances* with any of our Confederates, to withstand or refuse it.

But this being an Article of great Importance, I shall therefore with a most profound Submission, and I hope with a proportionable Modesty, endeavour to bring several things into view in reference thereunto. And whereas tho' all *Europe* do give to the *British* the Reputation of extraordinary Courage and Bravour, and have justly vouchsafed to them, the Character which *Livy* bestoweth on the *Romans*, That even *Struuntur*, not *vincuntur* animis, That their being overcome, doth not abate their Fortitude; nevertheless it hath been mentioned to our Reproach by many, that we have been usually on the losing Hand in most, if not in all Treaties, wherein we have been concerned. As if they would thereby intimate, that such as have been employed by us in Transactions of that kind, have had either too much of the Fool, or of the Knave in them, for the understanding and pursuing the Credit and Interest of those who had trusted them. But as on *Richelieu's* being advanced to the Conduct of the Regal Concerns of *Lewis* 13th of *France*, after that a weak and corrupt Ministry were discharged, and on his making that King to appear in another figure in the World, than at any time before he had done, the *Italians* are reported to have said, that all the Fools in *France* were dead; so I do not only hope, but dare positively foretel, that whatsoever Affairs, whether relating to the Glory of the Sovereign, or to the Prosperity of these Dominions

may come on the *Tapit* in any Congress whatsoever, shall be managed with that Wisdom, Integrity and Courage, which shall not only sufficiently vindicate us from the Ignominy with which we have been aspersed, but exalt the Honour of the Government, and of these Nations elsewhere, as well as here, on the Motives of Wisdom and Integrity, as much as our Military Bravour, hath been at any time any where esteemed.

And whereas it may not be amiss, to give some Instances, wherein the Sovereigns of *England* have been either wonderfully mistaken, or treacherously misled, as well in the refusing Honourable Terms of Peace, when they were offered; as in the Embarking in a needless and ruinous War, when there was no necessity for it, I shall call over an Example of ancient Dates as to each, and thereby avoid making Reflections on the late Ministry, tho' Miscarriages, in reference to both, might be justly fastned upon them. Whereof the First shall be, that *Charles* the 7th of *France* having offered to Grant unto us *Guien* and *Normandy*, on the alone Condition of our doing Homage for them, which we were in Justice previously obliged unto, yet that we had the Weakness, as well as the Pride scornfully to refuse the doing it. On which the said *Charles*, the Year after, being 1435, concluded a Treaty with *Philip* Duke of *Burgundy* at *Arras*; whereby he put himself into such a Condition, as to be able not only the next Year, to cause us to abandon *Paris*, which we then held, but by degrees, and that very speedily after, to drive us even out of *Guien* and *Normandy*, and excepting *Calis*, and a few other little Places, out of whatsoever we had, either by ancient Legitimate Titles, or by Warlike Acquisitions, been possessed of in *France*. And as to our Embarking in an unnecessary War, when we might have honourably avoided it, I shall only call over *Queen Mary's* denouncing War, on the Importunity of
Her

Her Husband *Philip* the *II.* of *Spain*, against *Hen. II.* of *France*. Which as it was a very impolitic thing with relation to her People, so the Event was mischievously answerable, by the Loss of *Callis*, Anno 1558, after we had been for 210 Years in the Possession of it, and thereby of an Entry into that Kingdom, whensoever a just Quarrel should arise between them and us. The Loss whereof did so deeply affect and impress that poor Queen, that it both hastned her Death, and had made her cause to have Pope *Paul* the 4th told, that whensoever she should die, the Loss of *Callis* (in case she were dissected) would be found to lie at her Heart. 'Tis true, that even upon a supposed unhappy Issue of the present War, (which God prevent) we have nothing now of that kind to be recovered by *France*; notwithstanding whereof, I hope that I may be allowed to say, that we are, in case the said War should terminate unfortunately, liable to that which will be of more fatal and mischievous Consequence, than what we have been speaking of was, Namely, That in too great a Probability we may not only be shur out from all Trade with *Spain*, but become obnoxious to the having our whole Traffick into the *Mediterranean* and the *Levant*, and even into *Portugal*, rendred vastly expensive, as well as unconceivably hazardous; which would be prejudicial, yea ruinous to these Dominions, beyond what either the Loss of *Callis*, or of any thing we had remaining to us in *France* in *Queen Mary's* Time, could amount, yea, or approach unto.

But to proceed to the bringing into Light such things, which it may concern *Ministers* of *State* to have under their Consideration with relation to *Treaties* of Peace; there are several Particulars adapted and subservient thereunto, which I do crave Liberty to propose, and with all the Modesty, and with all the Compendiousness that I possibly can. Whereof the

First is, That it is incumbent upon all such Ministers, as they would discharge their Duty faithfully toward their Prince in reference thereunto, to acquaint him so as to get him possessed with a full Belief thereof; that as there are few Kings or States in the World, who do not prefer the Interest of their Crown, and of their Dominions, to that of their Consciences, so it is their Duty to tell him, that it is not only consistent with his Veracity, with respect to the Treaties in which he becometh Embarked, but that it is a great part of his Religion towards God, to have, both in his making and keeping of Treaties, a more singular and distinguishing Regard to the Welfare of his People, than to his own personal Honour. Not should any thing be oftner and more importunately pressed by a faithful Minister of State upon his Prince, than that he is rather and more eminently obliged to have always in his Mind, what he doth as he is a Sovereign, than what he doth in his personal Capacity. And most certainly, there is more Truth in that Saying of Cardinal *Richtien's*, than some unthinking and weak People are willing to acknowledge, Namely, That the Eternal Salvation of Princes dependeth more upon their Governing well Politically, than upon their Living well Morally. So that the Obligations, which by the Divine Law Princes are under to their Subjects, being both previous unto, and more binding on their Consciences, than what their own Stipulations with Men of any Degree can render them bound to perform; those therefore of the first kind, are not only to Regulate and Govern; but to Annul and Conceal the obliging Force of the latter in all Cases, wherein the fulfilling of both is not practicable. And tho' Kings, upon the having brought themselves into such Circumstances, as to becometh tied to the doing of things which are irreconcilable the one to the other, ought not only both

to blame their own Weakness for the having done so, and to punish with the utmost Severity those on whose Advices they confided who misled them thereunto, but they are also to beg earnestly of God, that he would forgive unto them, their having staked their Faith and Honour for the performing of that, which an Antecedent and Superior Obligation had precluded them from the doing of. So that in a Word, Princes are to reckon all such Treaties, to stand vacated and superceeded, and that they are neither on the Foot of Truth and Veracity, or on any other Principle or Motive whatsoever, to esteem themselves tied, confined, or circumscribed by them.

The next Particular, which I am to speak unto, in relation to our entring upon a Treaty of Peace is, that upon the finding our selves, as we happily do, to be so far superior in the Field over our Enemies, as that they are willing to condescend to accept such Terms of Peace, as may not be worse and more ruinous to them, than the Consequences and Effects of continuing the War, are probable, not to say possible, to be, how that in such a Cause, it is not only the Wisdom, but even the Duty of a Wise Prince, to insist upon Gentle and easy Demands. And to exact no more in order thereunto of an Enemy, over whom we have been successful, and have obtained great Advantages in the Ways of Hostility; but that together with Moderate Recompences for the Damages we have sustained, and the Expences we have been at in the Prosecution of the said War, we do disable, as well as discourage, those who had been our Principal Enemies, both from judging it to be their Interest, and from the gratifying of their Ambition, in the commencing another against us. And that instead of exacting that from them, which may either be disgraceful to them, or may render them unsafe in their Dominions, and precarious in their Sovereignries, we would
be

be contented with the obtaining those Benefits in our Traffick, by Exportation thither, and Importation from thence, which we do need, and they may Grant. For as these Methods of proceeding towards them, will shew that we are willing to do to others, what were we in the like Condition, we would have done to our selves; so in the Room of leaving Angry Resentments, or of begetting Fresh Rancours in them toward us, it would both cultivate and confirm a lasting Amity in them for us, and gives us the Reputation both among them, and among all others where the Report and Fame thereof should come, of being generous, as well as merciful Enemies. And with reference hereunto Ministers of State should themselves consider, and withal lay before their Sovereign, what the *Privarnates* are by *Livy* reported to have said to the *Roman Senate*, namely, *Si bonam Pacem dederitis & fidelem & perpetuam, si malam, haud diuturnam*, if you will vouchsafe us a Good Peace, we will constantly and faithfully keep it; but if you do impose a Bad one upon us, we will no longer observe it, than untill we are in a Condition to break it. Now whether some of our *Allies*, and that by the Advice and Influence of those among our selves, who lately took upon them the alone and whole Conduct and Steerage of our affairs, have not either egregiously mistook, or treacherously prevaricated in this Matter, is not for a Mean and Private Man, as I am, to give an Opinion concerning, but it ought to be referred to the Inquisition and Judgment of the Parliament, to which I do with the Profoundest Humility submit it.

A Third Thing relative to our entring upon, and our pursuing *Treaties* of Peace, which it doth not only greatly concern those who are Ministers of State, to be themselves at all times fully possessed with the belief of, but to be frequently representing it to their Sovereign, is, that the Fittest Season for the

be.

beginning and the proceeding to the concerting thereof will be, when our Enemies do make the First Proposals thereof to us, and not to adjourn the hearing and weighing on a *Congress* of *Plenipotentiaries* from our selves, and from all who are confederated with us in the present War, what our said Enemies are willing to offer for the obtaining thereof, untill we come to be reduced to such Circumstances and Necessities our selves; which we had avoided to foresee or imagine, as may necessitate us to make the First Application for a Peace to our Enemies. For as our coming when we are first applied to, to treat of Peace, will conduce most to the advancing of our Honour in all Nations whatsoever; so if such a Peace be not concluded, as may be more advantageous for us, than if we had been the First Movers for the compassing of it, must be unavoidably resolved, either into the Weakness, or into the Treachery, of those, who are at the Helm of Affairs, and of such whom they employ in that Transaction. Now whether that as some of our Allies did act much otherways in what I have been mentioning, than what we had Reason in Justice to have expected from them, so whether some among our selves, by their advising the said Allies to behave therein as they did, have not carried themselves criminally in the most superlative Degree to Her Majesty and to Her Dominions, will be worthy of the Disquisition and Animadversion of the Parliament. Who cannot fail to observe, that as a Peace, which may be safe and honourable, can never come too soon to a Nation, that is given to Agriculture, Manufacture, and all kind of Marine Traffick whatsoever, as ours is; so that such Peace, would never be refused by a British King or Queen (unless they were misled by their Ministers) in that it is not their Interest to seek and pursue Forreign Conquests in *Europe*. And that therefore the declining on our Part, to hear such Proposals, as
were

were not only consistent with both these, but greatly subservient to the promoting them, can have proceeded from none save such, of whom Tacitus Hist. lib. 3. gives the Character, namely that in *Turbas & discordias pessimo enique plurima vis*; while *pax & quies bonis artibus indigent*: i. e. the worst Men have usually the greatest Influence, and do make the most Advantage, during a War; whereas Qualities, whereof good people only are Masters, will be requisite in the time of, and for the Improvement of Peace. Nor can so Loyal a Parliament, as the present is, forget whose Endeavour it was, during the whole Reign of King Ch. 2. to have gotten and kept that Prince involved in Foreign Wars, in order to their becoming thereupon in a Condition, of not only stripping the Sovereign of the chiefest Prerogatives of the Crown, and of forcing him to part with and to alienate the hereditary Lands belonging thereunto; but their own growing thereby inabled to subvert the very Monarchy it self, which was what they projected, and pursued in all the ways they could from the Restoration.

The whole which therefore I will presume farther to bring into View in relation thereunto, shall be briefly, and also with the utmost Modesty I can, to declare what my Opinion is, with respect to our omitting to hearken to the forementioned Importunate Proposals of the French King for a Treaty of Peace, in order to the giving a Period to his Sanguinary and Impoverishing War, on the part of the Confederates, as well as on that of their Enemies. Namely how that besides our becoming accountable, as well for the Blood shed, as for the Treasure expended, since those Overtures of Peace, made by our Enemies, were by us and our Confederates rejected, how that now such Alterations are arisen in the Affairs of Europe, as do give us more Dismal Surmises and Views, in relation to the Issue of the War, wherein we are engaged, than we could antecedently thereunto, have

either

either apprehended or feared. For not only Affairs in *Spain*, have put on another Face, and do appear in a Figure, more menacing to the Confederates, than they either then, or at any time before that, had done, but even matters in *France*, are since then become so changed, as to give such hopes to that Monarch, as he could not before have flattered himself with, of his being at last in a Condition of defeating, as well as of withstanding, all the Designs and Attempts of the *Allies* against him. Nor could any one thing have contributed more to the uniting and enflaming his Subjects, to a Readiness of Sacrificing their Lives, as well as to a cheerful giving up all the Wealth and Treasure of any kind, which they possess, than his having shewed a Willingness of procuring Peace to his People, upon any Terms, which might have been safe to them, tho' such as would have been dishonourable to himself. Whereas among the Subjects of most, if not of all the *Allies*, there hath on the Motive of the Rejection of the Proposals made by the *French* for a Treaty of Peace, a strange and almost an universal Aversion arisen, in relation to the Continuance of the Support of the War, either with their Persons or their Purse; yea, they do with a daring Boldness alledge and avow in Justification of themselves therein, that as beyond what can be either expressed, or even conceived, they are already exhausted both as to Men and Money; so the very putting an end to the War, and that on the Supposition it could be both speedily and honourably done, will not free nor relieve them from the annual Payment of vast Taxes for an Age to come, and that merely for the Discharge of Debts which are already contracted, and for the reimbursing of such as are Creditors therein, the Kingdom stands Parliamentarily Mortgaged. And let me be here allowed to say, That tho' no Man who is honest, and withal discreet, doth either by rea-

son of his present Impoverishment, or because of the Burdens, and the Calamities thereupon, which he seeth entailed upon himself and his Posterity for many Years, envy either the Gentlemen of the Sword, or those of Civil Stations, any Acquisitions, which through good Oeconomy, they have made by their just Pay and legal Salaries; yet nevertheless they cannot avoid thinking it worthy of the Inquisition of the Parliament, who they are of any Degree or Sort whatsoever, that have made themselves opulent by Frauds, Rapines and sinistruous Methods, practised either towards the Government or the People. Concerning which, the whole I will presume to say is, That as no Proceedings against such can be too severe, so the worst possible to be done, and inflicted upon them, will be pleasing and grateful to the generality of the Subjects; it would to them, as *Tacitus Hist. lib. 1. expresseth it, be Grande gaudium, quod iam pampere forent, quibus donasset —, quam quibus abstulisset.* For it is, as the same *Tacitus* saith, *Historiar. lib. 4. insita moralibus natura recentem aliorum felicitatem agris oculis introspicere, modumque fortuna a nullis magis exigere, quam quos in equo videre:* Both which Passages I do forbear to translate: But that nothing withal can be so rigorous against those who have been guilty in the ways insinuated, which will not redound to the Honour of the Parliament, even tho' they then be carried to the acting what might therein prove iniquous to some, I dare venture upon an Observation that *Tacitus, ubi supra* maketh, to affirm, Namely, That *Habet aliquid ex iniquo omne magnum exemplum, quod contra singulos utilitate publica rependitur; i. e. Tho' the proceeding against such, might in reference to some be found blameable, yet that the benefit done to the Publick, by the making a Precedent in the Punishment of so great a Villany, would both be a Compensation for, and a Justification of, the Injury which a few might*
Justain.

Justain. And as *Seneca* saith, *lib. 1. de ira, nec ulla dura videtur Curatio, cujus est salutaris affectus.* Whereunto might be farther added under this Particular, that the War, which the *Grand Seignior*, and they who are come into Concert with him, are about to commence; cannot fail of making those Impressions upon diverse, with whom we are confederated in the present War against *France*, &c. as we may justly suspect will have a very prejudicial Influence both on the said Confederacy, and even upon all who are therein concerned. And that which giveth us the more melancholly Prospect in reference thereunto, is, That we do not hitherto certainly know who, besides the King of *Sweden* have stipulated to give the *Sultan* Assistance in the War that he is about to begin. Only we have too much ground for suspecting, that there are diverse others, who are both ready, and have also obliged themselves to act in concert therein with him. Which tho' it be not fit for so mean a Man as I am, to pretend to give a positive Account who all of them are; yet it will not be difficult to make a probable Conjecture concerning them, to any that know the World, and do allow themselves Time and Liberty of thinking.

But to proceed to the laying open of a *Fourth* Particular relating to a *Treaty* of Peace, wherein a *Minister* of State will have Occasion, as well for the Exercise of his utmost Fidelity, as for the Manifestation of his greatest Wisdom, in the Counsels he is to give to his Sovereign, which will be in the giving his Opinion and Advice, who among the many of Her Majesty's Subjects, may be the most fit and proper to be employed, and trusted, in a Transaction of that kind, and of so great Importance. And I do here take it for granted, that none will be thought worthy the being honoured with the Conduct of so grand an Affair, save such as are Persons, not only thoroughly instructed in

what may both concern our selves and our Allies, and wherein our several and respective Interests do unite, and wherein they differ, and are such as have been trained up and experienced in the Conduct of great and publick Transactions and Affairs; but such who are as well of an approved and consummated Wisdom, as of a superior, or at least of a more than ordinary Genius. In that in Congresses of Plenipotentiaries upon such an Occasion, not only matters relating to the Quarrel between our selves and those in Confederacy with us, and our and their Enemies; but matters referring to the Laws of Nations, and to Rights and Claims founded thereupon, may come to be brought upon the *Tapit*, for the unravelling and deciding whereof, all the foregoing Qualifications and Accomplishments, will not only be indispensably necessary, but hardly sufficient, which will not seem strange to any, who do but allow themselves to consider, that what *Seneca, Epist. 22.* saith of *Gladiators*, namely, how *in arena capiunt consilium*, on the very Spot and Theatre of Action, they are forced to retreat into themselves for fresh Counsel and Advice, in what manner they are to behave, whether in the way of pushing, or of guarding, and in what manner to act in each, cometh often to be the Case of such, as are employed in Congresses of that kind we have been speaking of. Nor could such as have a Zeal for the Honour of the present Government, and for the Reputation and Prosperity of these Dominions, avoid bewailing the Choice generally made under the late Ministry of such as were appointed for Envoys, Ambassadors, and Plenipotentiaries from hence, to Princes and States Abroad. Seeing, that excepting a very few, such as were commonly entrusted and employed under the aforesaid Characters, were Persons altogether unadaptd for the answering and the supporting them. So that upon my being

forced

forced to think, that the bare naming of them in Print, would be but a Redding, and a Spreading the Scandal and Infamy, which have thereby been brought upon the Queen Herself, as well as upon these Nations; I shall therefore content my self with the calling over in reference thereunto, what *Soleman* hath told us, Prov. 26. 6, viz. *That he who sendeth a Message by the Hand of a Fool (by which he meaneth the using of an unproper Person to transact his Affairs) cutteth off the Feet and drinketh Damage.*

To all which foregoing Particulars, relating to a *Treaty of Peace*, there doth remain, yet another to be added in the *Sixth Place*, wherein a *Minister of State* will have as great occasion for the Exercise of his *Fidelity* in the Advice he giveth to his *Sovereign*, as he could have in any of the former. Namely, That whensoever he is to Counsel his *Prince*, about the Election of Persons, who are to assist in, and to superintend the Transaction of an Affair of that Moment, as that according to the Issue it hath, not only these Nations will come to be affected in whatsoever either their Prosperity, or their Safety, are included and involved; but the very Stability of the Government, and likewise both the *Glory* and the *Security* of the Regnant Prince, will be found to be concerned, and even to be wrapt up in the most distinguishing and singular manner, that it is next too possible for them to be; I do say, how that in his giving Counsel to his *Sovereign*, about the Choice of those who are so employed and trusted in that matter, he is to take special care that he doth not approve of, and much less do recommend any, save such, who besides there being Men of approved and of inviolable Uprightness and Integrity, may be also Persons, not only of known Loyalty and Fealty to Her Majesty, but such as have a sincere and ardent Love, together with such a Zeal for the *British* Monarch, which nothing that

that is sublunary and secular can diminish or alter. By Attendance to which Rules and Measures, they who are Ministers of State will find themselves obliged to give their Advice, not only against the employing such in and about the forementioned Affairs, as are justly suspected to be of Republican Principles, or even but reasonably believed to stand so much as indifferently and coldly affected to the Person of their Sovereign; but also to be careful, as not themselves to recommend; so not to fail in vigorously opposing any Recommendation, that may be made to others, of Persons to be put into the aforesaid Trust, who instead of their being either pleased with, or calmly and silently acquiescing in the Alterations, which have lately been made in the publick Ministry, and in other Stations, do not only openly reflect upon, and complain of, but do menacingly, as well as clamorously, murmur by reason of them. Wherenpon let me be allowed here not only to say, That as it would be no less than downright Treachery, for any of those who are in the present Ministry, to advise Her Majesty to put such into any Stations whatsoever, whom upon necessary as well as wise Motives and Reasons, She hath been pleased to discharge and to lay aside from the Exercise of the Trusts and Offices, with which She had honoured, and wherein She had employed them; but let me even also be permitted farther to add, That it neither would, nor ought to escape the being accounted an egregious Weakness in those who are come into the present Ministry, to give Counsel to Her Majesty for Her employing such in any Offices of Moment, who are known to have been the Creatures Favourites, and the distinguished Dependents upon those Persons, who for weighty Causes are come to be reduced from the sublime Stations to which they had been exalted. Nor would the giving such Counsel to Her Majesty, be only the putting Her upon the imitating
of

of those, who when they have swept the House, do leave the Dust behind the Door, to be immediately scattered upon the Floor again; but it were also the putting Her upon the bringing in such, whose Principles are irreconcilable, to concenter in the same Designs and Actions, which is no less impracticable to be done, than the making Two Contradictories to agree, which all Mankind do acknowledge to be impossible. Not that I do in the least intend the having it believed, that every one, who caressed, and pretended to dedicate his Service to those Persons when they were in Power, did it from any malignant Principle towards the Crown and State, but meerly on the Inducement of their own Advantage and Personal Interest. For I am fully persuaded, that what *Terentius* (who having been the Friend of *Sejanus*, and thereof after his Fall accused) is by *Tacitus Annal. lib. 6.* reported the having in his own Vindication said to *Tiberius* in the Senate, may be justly applied unto, and no less equally pleaded by others. Namely, *Non est nostrum aestimare, quem supra ceteros Et quibus de causis extollas: tibi rerum Judicium Diu dedere, nobis obsequii gloria relicta est. i. e. It doth not belong to us to judge those you prefer, or for what Reasons you do it, Forasmuch as that peculiarly appertaineth to you, while the whole which doth properly belong to us, is the meer Glory of obeying.* Yet, notwithstanding, it may be allowed, that tho' some particular Men who vouched themselves great Devotees of the late Ministers when they were in Power, may not be chargeable on that account with any great Crime, either against the Safety of the Government, or the Prosperity of their Country; it would nevertheless be both a most unreasonable thing in it self, and a wonderful Weakness in any of the present Ministry, that any of that sort of Men should be held fit to be now employed in Trusts and Offices of Importance. Seeing, as
there

there are many others, who are not liable to the Aspersions of Selfishness and Sycophancy, from which the Persons whom we have been tacitly insinuating cannot be excused; so there are among them, those who are both qualified for the Execution of all the Offices whatsoever, and adapted for the bearing the sublimest Characters, which the Government can bestow, or will have Occasion to confer. And before I do conclude this Particular, there is one thing which I know not how to be honest and loyal without the mentioning of, namely, That tho' I do know of none, who will be displeased with the extending of all the Mercy to those degraded and laid aside, which it is possible to have exercised and exerted towards them, in consistency with the Preservation of the Laws of the Constitution, and with the Security of the very Substances of the Government for the future; yet on the other Hand, I can neither meet with, nor hear of any Persons of Loyalty to Her Majesty, and who do preserve an Affection to the British Monarchy, that are not of a firm Belief, that there can be no such Accommodation made with the late Ministers, as to restore them to Trust and Power, without the exposing both the Queen and the Monarchy to hazards, which I will not express. In that it is reckoned by all who have a Tenderness for Her Majesty's Person, and a Zeal for Royal Government, that should these late Ministers get into the Management of Affairs again, how that there would be nothing which they would not venture upon and attempt, to whomsoever, or to whatsoever it might be prejudicial and ruinous, rather than put the Loss of their great Posts, and of their Lucrative Places, and the being once more stripes of their Domination over the Court it self, as well as over the Kingdom, to a second Venture. And the finding some of those to behave themselves with the Servileness, as well as with the Submission, that they

now

now do, causeth those who are wise, instead of hoping, that in case they should be re-advanced to their former Posts, they would act otherwise than they heretofore did entertain a contrary Opinion of them, and to believe that their assuming the Figure of being become lowly and humble Persons, is meer scaffolding in order to the mounting to a Height and Greatness of being able to revenge themselves upon whomsoever they shall please either to think, or to say, had been their Enemies. Nor do there want Precedents hereof, even in the Records of the sacred Scriptures, as well as in Human Histories. Whereof as *Absalom* is registred for an Instance in the former, of whose Carriage, in that Kind and Way, there is a full Account given us, 2 *Sam.* 15. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. where the Reader may peruse it if he please; so we have in the latter many Examples given us of the like Instances, of whom *Tacitus* tells us of *Otho*, how in order to his compassing the Destruction of the Emperor *Galba*, that *Protendens manus*, he did *adorare vulgum jacere oscula & omnia serviliter pro imperio*, Embrace, Worship, Hugg and Caress the very meanest of the People, in Subserviency to his Ambition for his getting into the Throne. Yea *Solomon* doth not only assure us, that he who hateth, dissembleth with his Lips, and layeth up Deceit within him: And that when he speaketh fair, we are not to believe him, because there are Seven Abominations in his Heart, Prov. 26. 24, 25. but he doth withal warn us against hearkning to such, by telling us, That Confidence in an unfaithful Man, is like a broken Tooth, and a Foot out of Joynt, Prov. 25. 19.

But it being more than time to put a Period to this Discourse, which is already grown to a much greater length than I intended it should, I shall therefore finally, and in the Seventh Place, add only this farther, wherein Her Majesty's present Ministers of State may,

with relation to a *Treaty of Peace*, have Occasion for the Exercise both of their Wisdom and their *Fidelity*. Namely, That some with whom we are at this time in Confederacy, for the carrying on of the present War, have in all the *Alliances* of the like Nature, in which since they were a Free Independent State, they have at any time been engaged ; how that in every one of them they have not only anticipated, but in effect deserted, those who were their Allies, by the making a previous, and thereupon a divided Peace for themselves. It is true, that I may not therein paint them Blacker than they were ; that they did always stipulate for some sort of *Terms* to be granted to the Confederates ; but as those *Terms* were not such as their Allies had expected, nor so much as concerted with their antecedent and concurrent Advice ; yet nevertheless they were made bound to accept them, within such Limitations of time, as that Confederate State had thought fit to confine them unto, or else to be left without the Aid and Assistance of that State which had been their Allies, to continue those Wars separately and by themselves, and both to bear the whole Charges, and to run all the Hazards alone, which would be either necessary to support them, or might come to attend and be Effects and Consequences of them in the Issue. Of all which, such who are acquainted with Transactions of this kind, need to seek for no further Evidences, than the *Treaties* of *Munster*, *Nimiguen*, *Aix la Chappel*, and even of *Reswick*. But whereas to insist upon this, would no ways be decent for a private Man, I shall therefore supercede to discourse farther about it, and conclude the whole I have to say, with the calling over what *Tacitus*, *Histor. lib. 2.* says concerning *Paulinus*, viz. *Cui causa consilia cum ratione, quam prospera ex casu placerent*, i. e. That he thought *Wise Counsels* better than *Rash*, tho' the last might be more successful. For which

the


the Spartans had made it an Order of *their State*, that whensoever any of *their Generals* had compassed his Design by Policy or Treaty, he should sacrifice an Ox; but that when he did it by Force, or Blood, he should only offer a Cock. From which Plutarch observeth, how much they preferred the Atchievements of Sober Counsels, before those of Strength and Power.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

PART II. p. 22. l. 12. r. *Sovereignty*. Part III. p. 11. l. 22. for *Vane* r. *Vare*. P. 38. l. 14. before *Usurpation* r. *his*; p. 45. l. 25. for *best* r. *least*; p. 46. l. 17. r. *Ædui*; p. 47. l. 30. r. *Galgacus*; Ibid, l. 33. r. *ambiriosi*; p. 48. l. 26. after *than* r. *nor*.

the Spaniards had made it an Order of their State, that
 notwithstanding any of their Generals had compassed his De-
 struction by Policy or Treachery, he should be treated as an Ox; but
 that when he died it by Force or Blood, he should only be
 for a Goat. From which Plutarch observeth, how
 much they preferred the Achievements of Sobriety
 before those of Strength and Power.



FINIS

ERRATA

Page II. p. 22. l. 22. r. Semper. Page III. p. 21. l. 22.
 for Vnde. p. 38. l. 1. before Omnes r. his; p.
 47. l. 22. for huius r. huius; p. 48. l. 17. r. huius; p. 47. l. 30. r.
 Cagnus; p. 48. l. 22. r. Cagnus; p. 48. l. 22. r. Cagnus.

the
only
way
to
be
in
the

p
3